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Series Introduction
It is with great pleasure that we introduce this first volume of a new series of Naval War
College (NWC) monographs. It is sponsored by the College’s Leidos Chair of Future
Warfare Studies and the Institute for Future Warfare Studies (IFWS) within the Strategic and Operational Research Department (SORD) of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies (CNWS). Please add to that pleasure (and onslaught of acronyms) a tide of
humility and earnest prayers for this volume’s utility.
We have nicknamed this new monograph series the Black Books. This is in honor of
the long-standing series of Blue Books, the international law studies volumes published
by NWC’s Stockton Center for International Law (the first volume of which dates from
1895, making it the oldest international law journal in the United States), as well as the
more recent, though already widely respected, Red Books of NWC’s China Maritime
Studies Institute (CMSI).
Obviously, we desire to match the excellence of the preceding series with another “color
revolution,” so to speak, this one in applied research on national-security issues. Black
is the color of outer space and the ocean’s greatest depths, and, traditionally, the symbol
of the unknown. In artistic terms, it is described as the absorption of all colors so that
none are reflected back to the eye. Black appears as the void into which great light—wisdom out of inquiry—can be projected. We hope that these Black Books will provide the
backdrop for expanding and continuing public discussions on the topics they identify
and examine. They are intended to be but the start of critical public investigations and
dialogue, not their conclusion.
The monographs in the series will be linked to a common theme. Their objective is to
aid readers in understanding issues impacting current choices that ultimately will determine the course of war and peace into the far future. This is as much a practical policy
endeavor as a scholarly one.
Each monograph is the individual product of the author or authors. The volumes are the
products of personal effort and are not, and are not intended to be, official statements
of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or
any other agency of the U.S. government. As the standard disclaimer reads: the views
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expressed are those of the authors and editors and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the U.S. government.
No research into national security or other social science issues truly can be “valuefree” or “value neutral.” Humans never can be neutral about other humans. Obviously,
the authors and editors care deeply about the future security, prosperity, and happiness
of the American people, and those of their allies and friends, but in this series we will
strive to provide as much rigor and balance as possible in the research and analyses,
as well as respect for other points of view. In this, we admit our biases to permit the
reader’s greater understanding.
We give great thanks to the Naval War College Foundation (NWCF) and the Leidos
Corporation’s most generous support to the NWCF in donating resources used in funding the research of the Leidos Chair and the Institute for Future Warfare Studies. It is
in part through their generosity, without expectation of recompense, that we are able to
offer this Black Book series to the public.

Introduction
Sa m J. Ta ngre di

Distilling a lifetime of career experience to provide insights for future generations is a
daunting challenge. Although they may be critical to the education of those who will
hold similar positions of responsibility, such insights do not always lend themselves
to formal academic instruction, especially when the experiences seem to contradict
some of the tightly held theories and idealizations of professional scholars. In the area
of naval and military affairs, strategy development and subsequent decision-making
rarely follow the prescribed path of the logical and formal process diagrams outlined in
textbooks and statements of doctrine.
This is particularly true for planning and decision-making in periods of utmost pressure, stress, and danger, such as when military forces consider that combat operations
may be imminent. Yet it is likewise true during periods of apparent peace but great strategic and economic uncertainty. Strategic planning in such organizations at such times
may occur with the structure and regularity of ocean waves; but those waves become
erratic in shape and form once they hit rocks and shoals and eventually crash on the
beach. It is hard to capture and describe fully the eternal need of strategists to adapt to
environmental conditions that twist objectives and constantly threaten to capsize—or at
least transform—the formal planning process itself.
The author of this monograph attempts to capture exactly that.
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Planners versus Planning versus Plans
The “great captains” of military history have described the contradictions between rigorous, formal, institutionalized planning and the commonly chaotic results and necessary readjustments through a series of pithy aphorisms that by now have become clichés.
The Prussian field marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder is cited—routinely, exhaustingly, almost annoyingly—as having said, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.”1
Yet perhaps Moltke captured the challenge more succinctly in a lesser-known but
more apt quote: “Strategy is a system of expedients; it is more than a mere scholarly
discipline.”2 Today, expedient often is used as a pejorative term, indicating a decision
based on immediate advantage without regard to consistency, logic, or ethics. In fairness, however, expedients can consist simply of morally neutral variables that merely
were not included in the original plan—humans not being omniscient. Meanwhile,
actual conditions on Earth change constantly. Moltke’s intent is to convey the point that
the strategist should expect, even anticipate, disruptions to the planning process and
must be able to go beyond the “discipline” or structure of his or her training. The problem for strategists is how to learn to do this; it is a skill that largely must be self-taught.
A second problem, rarely described in treatises on the planning process, is determining
how and when to stop the formal planning phase and commence implementation, yet to
remain ready to modify the plan in the midst of (violent) attention-absorbing activity—
in other words, to know when the plan is developed enough to be put into action with a
chance of success. At some point, one must take the chance, then stand ready to correct
the plan. This always involves risk and uncertainty. Reportedly, during the age of fighting sail the French command to put a ship about was à-Dieu-va—roughly in English,
“we must chance and trust in God”—certainly an admission of the risks inherent in any
plan.3
An even more apocryphal aphorism illustrating this dilemma comes from American
general George S. Patton Jr., who is credited with saying, “A good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week.” Another, more plausible, version is
the following: “A good solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution
applied ten minutes later.”4 Neither version may be an accurate quote; however, both
capture the spirit of the author, as well as the reality that events rarely can wait for a plan
to be perfected. In that sense, no effective plan or strategy—that is, a plan that affects
events—is ever complete.
A third problem involves decision makers who act in a manner opposite to a Patton, with caution toward full commitment to a plan that is only partly (or not at all)
their own. In this situation—one discussed from various approaches in the “howto” segments of this volume—the strategic planner often must operate as a strategic
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entrepreneur—a marketer and salesperson, so to speak. The planner must convince the
decision makers that the plan should be adopted and attempted. In theory, it was these
very decision makers who charged the strategic planner with creating the plan, so they
should be eager to adopt it. Yet the reality can be that a strategy may be developed simply because an organization has a planning staff, members of which anticipate the need
for a plan; whereas decision makers may not see any need for a comprehensive plan,
particularly when they are accustomed to improvising to meet emerging management
requirements and conditions.
Even when a new operating environment appears to be emerging, the need for a new
strategy may be resisted. The decision makers may feel themselves too busy to examine
the details of a comprehensive plan, particularly one created without their direct input.
Some may question the need for a publicly articulated plan, since they view themselves—occupying the nexus of decision—as issuing the organization’s “plan” through
their very decisions. A plan implies that many people in an organization may examine
it, and will base their individual or intermediate decisions on its written objectives. This
is among the reasons that decision makers who hate to delegate generally hate plans.
Other decision makers who have little use for public planning often fear that such plans
may “give potential secrets away” or pin the organization down and leave too little room
for changes in policy. Often there is an additional fear that one sector’s plan may “get
ahead of” and contradict the thinking at the very top, causing the displeasure of bosses
5
or some level of disharmony within the organization.
That this has happened periodically in the U.S. Navy—touted as one of the best-planned
organizations in history—is no great secret. The Navy, along with the Marine Corps,
earned a deserved reputation by planning for a potential war with imperial Japan for at
least twenty years before the Pearl Harbor attack made that war a reality in 1941. The
Cold War’s Maritime Strategy of the 1980s often is held up as a paragon of comprehensive, iterative, and highly creative planning that contributed to the containment and
eventual collapse of the Soviet Union without resort to global (and possibly nuclear)
war.6 Yet during periods of its history, and particularly in more-recent years, which have
been characterized by “jointness”—an important contribution to increasing interoperability among the armed services, but one that has concreted into an ideology—Navy
leaders have been suspicious about contemplating and developing (let alone adopting)
plans that are more than exact repetitions of higher guidance. Why allow strategists
to roam intellectually—and especially publicly—in crafting options if that may create
debate and dissension within the organization, as well as raise public expectations of
results that cannot be guaranteed?
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A fourth problem, one generated by the nonlinear nature of planning and response, is
that it is hard ever to quantify the results of a successful plan, so as to use that plan as a
model of success from which strategists should learn. Presumably the most successful
defense strategies are those that deter or prevent war rather than wage it. However, both
strategists and scholars uniformly have been unsuccessful in demonstrating that deterrence strategies actually deterred particular wars. There simply are too many independent variables—some of them unrecognized—that might result in a war having not been
fought. If one cannot point to strategies having definitive outcomes, how can one point
7
to the importance of having a consistent strategy?
This difficulty is compounded by an additional paradox, phrased most succinctly by
Richard J. Danzig, an Under Secretary and then a Secretary of the Navy in the 1990s
and early 2000s. Danzig notes that “to the extent we foresee the future and effectively
8
address it, then the future will not develop as we anticipated it.” Thus, the optimal plan,
from a national security point of view, if adopted and enacted, never can “prove” the
threats it addressed. Acting on them caused the threats to dissipate before they became a
crisis, or they morphed into something else.
These four problems sum to a conundrum that is expressed best in a final aphorism:
“Planning is everything; the plan is nothing.” Management consultants have attributed
this wisdom—in its shortened form—to General, then President, Dwight D. Eisen9
hower (once Patton’s commander). In part, the quote agrees with that of Danzig in
maintaining that actual, specific plans—particularly when they deal with emergency
conditions—cannot predict events with enough certainty to be followed step-by-step.
Eisenhower: “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one
thing: the very definition of ‘emergency’ is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going
to happen the way you are planning.”10
In such unexpected crises, Eisenhower advises, “the first thing you do is to take all the
plans off the top shelf and throw them out the window and start once more. But if you
haven’t been planning you can’t start to work, intelligently at least. That is the reason it
is so important to plan, to keep yourselves steeped in the character of the problem that
you may one day be called upon to solve—or to help to solve.” Later in the same address,
Eisenhower softens his rhetoric concerning initially throwing plans out the window,
admitting that the contingency strategies that take human relations into account retain
some validity.11
However, the point of the adage—framing the conundrum itself—is that over the long
term the practice of “crafting strategy” is more valuable to any organization (and national security itself) than any specific strategy itself, because it trains an experienced
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cadre whose members can draft, debate, and update not just a plan for a specific condition but a concept of the organization’s professional character and understanding of
its continuing purpose. This is what the late Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington
meant by “strategic concept.”12 Without continuous planning—or a strategy-crafting
process—organizations can lose not only the plans that guide their actions (even if
much of them must be discarded once actual action occurs) but their own sense of self
and the justification for their own existence.
Table 1 summarizes the problems, paradoxes, and conundrums of military planning.
Obviously, it can be expanded to include other planning issues.
The author of this monograph discusses all these problem sets with a recognition that
the “crafting of strategy” is about the planners and the methods they use for planning, not about the specific result that is called a plan. The value of his observations
is derived from experiences that have been common in naval planning of which the
strategist-planners always should remain aware. The fact that many of these experiences
sometimes are counterintuitive or deviate from academic theories of planning makes
his contribution even more valuable for those who would be the planners—who need
continually to redevelop a planning process to update and revise their plans repetitively, or even to discard and replace them. The author avoids the use of the word plan,
preferring the word strategy to describe the complex nature of the “capstone” statement
13
of the Navy’s strategic concept. However—and as discussed later—the terms plan and
strategy always will remain conflated in public perception.
As Crafting Naval Strategy clearly articulates, the planning that strategists will do
(1) will require a series of expediencies; (2) likely will result in an imperfect plan that
will be used under conditions not fully foreseen; (3) will need to be conducted under
unrelenting time, bureaucratic, and political pressures; (4) may result in a product that
decision makers never will examine “fairly”—with logic and attention—because they
are enamored of an existing strategic concept, their own vague thoughts, or the newest
buzzwords; (5) may be never acknowledged fully or may remain hidden from view; and
(6) will produce a strategy that never can be proved to have accomplished successfully
that which was intended, even when events turn out favorably.
For those who are ready to take up this frustrating yet rewarding challenge of crafting
strategy, Bruce Stubbs certainly has something to say, and it is not simply about developing plans. It is, ultimately, about the fact that the strategists of the “Naval Service”
play the most significant role in helping the service define itself. And when we discuss
a unitary strategy for the Department of the Navy (which is the true meaning of the
“Naval Service”), we are describing how two services—the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine
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TABLE 1
PROBLEMS, PARADOXES, AND CONUNDRUMS OF CRAFTING PLANS AND STRATEGIES

Issue

Implications

Representative
Source

1

All plans are affected
by “expedients”

Crafting plans and strategies cannot be a
“scientific,” bounded process, but
needs to incorporate factors that have
indirect effects on the problem

Moltke the
Elder, 1871

2

Never a clear agreement
about what constitutes
a “satisfactory” plan

The decision to put plans into action
is subjective; speed of implementation always must be a consideration

Patton, 1944(?)

3

Decision makers not
directly involved in
plan development
remain skeptical

The crafting of plans and strategies
necessarily includes the act of convincing leadership of the validity of the
plan, or the very need for a plan

Recent experiences

4

Hard to quantify the
results of any plan

Interim evaluations of the ultimate
success of any plan remain difficult
since there is always risk in crediting emerging events to the plan

Traditional
experiences

5

If a plan is successful
it changes the environment, thereby requiring
a new plan and, possibly,
reducing the perception of its validity

If indeed the plan is achieving success, emerging events affected by the
plan will change the environment,
requiring adjustment of the plan

Danzig, 1999

6

Specific plans rarely can
account for unexpected changes in the
environment, and should
not be expected to

The process of planning and the
skills of the planners in adapting to changed circumstances are
more important than the product

Eisenhower, 1957

7

Current plans/strategies
define the organization’s concept of self
(strategic concept)

Crafting strategy goes beyond the
development of a plan to deal with
specific or broad problems; it involves
defining the organization’s purpose,
self-perception, and public justification

Huntington, 1954

Corps—define themselves individually and collectively (often, by courtesy, with the
involvement of the U.S. Coast Guard).14

Unpacking the Terms
Thus far we have used the terms strategy, plan, and strategic concept nearly interchangeably, which is pretty standard for all such discussions; even the grand theorist of war
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Carl von Clausewitz was guilty of this. Strategies, plans, and strategic concepts are
indeed, most obviously, interrelated. Strategists, often styled strategic planners, develop
all three. Yet, for the sake of precision and for the injection of some academic rigor, we
need to identify the nuances among the terms and how they are used in Crafting Naval
Strategy.
Although derived from the ancient Greek word strategia (or strategike), meaning the
arts or skill of a military commander (strategos, a combination of admiral and general),
it was not until around 1800 that the word strategy came into common use in describing
planning for war. Since then its popularity and ubiquity have increased to the point that
it is used to describe planning for almost every endeavor—business strategies, learning
strategies, dating strategies, etc. In her studies of the history of military strategy, Professor Beatrice Heuser of the University of Reading (U.K.) somewhat humorously recommends using “Strategy with a capital ‘S’” to describe “the link between political aims
15
and the use of force, or its threat.”
Strategy often is viewed as being complex, whereas plans are viewed as being simpler.
Some sources view a strategy as consisting merely of a series of interrelated plans. In this
monograph, Bruce Stubbs takes issue with that perception and argues that “strategy is
about understanding your environment and making choices about what you will do,”
whereas “planning is about making choices about how to use the resources you have
and the actions you will take to achieve the choices made in your strategy.” Some might
argue that this is an artificial separation, but it is based on Sir Lawrence D. Freedman’s
assertion that “strategy is more than a plan” because “strategy comes into play where
there is actual or potential conflict, when interests collide and forms of resolution are
required.”16
A definition of strategy that still retains influence, at least within naval intellectual
circles, is that of Rear Adm. Joseph C. Wylie Jr., USN, whose Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control was first published in 1967 and is still in print. “Strategy is
a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system
of measures for its accomplishment.”17 In that view, what separates a strategy from
desires or daydreams is the “system of measures” by which a strategy in progress can be
evaluated and adjusted as necessary. Although Stubbs does not cite Wylie, this perspective is very much in keeping with that of Freedman, who also states that strategy is “the
art of creating power,” which has similarity to Wylie’s idea of “power control.”18
In this volume, the author has opted for a definition that emphasizes components—
combining ends, ways, and means (and risk). The benefit of this definition is its simplicity in describing the outline of how strategists craft their work. However, there are some
who argue that the concepts underpinning defense strategies should be developed in
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an intellectual environment that ignores resource constraints. Such an environment
emphasizes and soars with the possible rather than remaining anchored by the practical. Doing so would allow military planners, in theory, to conceive and include solutions and weapons that are in the infancy of their development or do not even exist
yet. Others argue, however, that such an “idealized” approach cannot deal with those
expediencies required in strategic planning, as identified by Moltke. Stubbs’s addition of
scarce resources as a determinant is in keeping with Moltke, and aids in separating the
crafting of strategy from “concept development,” “writing doctrine,” and other military
intellectual activities.
The term strategist often is seen as being a bit grandiose, as if the user is implying that
he or she possesses a higher level of thinking than the norm. Thus, many who craft
strategy prefer to state, “I am a strategic planner,” rather than “I am a strategist.” Generally speaking, this looks better in a résumé (or at least it seems to display a pleasing
degree of humility). In the military, this also is sometimes a mark of deference—the
staff officers who put together the strategy are the strategic planners, whereas the commander who approves the strategy is the strategist. Yet, practically speaking, strategists
and strategic planners are the same.
Since the joint U.S. armed forces have conceptualized a three-tiered system in which
planning is categorized by command levels of activity—strategic, operational, and tactical—planners are divided into strategic planners, operational planners, and tacticians.
Under this approach, strategic planners draft their products for the highest level of command, generally for four- and three-star flag and general officers and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. However, all three groups craft strategy as that term is understood
generally and technically. In accordance with Stubbs’s approach, the membership of all
three groups must consist of strategists, along with other specialists. For many years,
the U.S. Navy used only two levels of distinction, the strategic and the tactical; thus, the
term strategists also included those working at the operational level. Now the strategyoperations separation is standard, which creates some confusion between how the
military actually creates strategy and general public perceptions.
There also is what might seem to be an esoteric debate within the Department of Defense (DoD)—fueled by joint ideology—on whether the individual services should be
allowed to describe their planning as strategy. In this view, strategy—which essentially is
conflated with war plans—properly belongs to the ten or so geographic and functional
combatant commanders, with supervision by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(and, de facto, the Joint Staff). These regional and functional strategies are developed
from a chain of documents initiated by the president and interpreted, in turn, by the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; all these documentary
interpretations can (and should) also be termed strategies. What plans the military
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departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and their individual services and service
chiefs might develop are therefore not strategy. They may be plans for manning, training, and equipping (the services’ Title 10 responsibilities); or they may be plans for developing platforms, weapon systems, and systems integration; but they are not strategies.
To take this to its absurd conclusion, planning personnel in the service staffs cannot be
considered strategists.
This is, of course, ideology, not logic. If strategy indeed is a series of plans, a method
of power control, or a determination of ends, ways, and means, the services must be
involved in its formation, since it is they that provide the force—that is, the means of
power, or simply the means—to the combatant commanders. Those who craft longrange plans logically are strategists, by whichever definition of strategy one prefers.
A way to dodge the whole joint debate—as I frequently have proposed—is to refer to the
19
services’ own internal strategies as strategic visions. This adds to the various definitions of strategies Huntington’s “strategic concept” approach to defining the service’s
purpose. The strategic concept term still might be useful—the Navy used it to indicate
underlying service principles until the 1990s—but for the last two decades the Joint Staff
has used the term concept to indicate a point of doctrine under development. The joint
concept-development process has become greatly formalized, with service representatives participating, inevitably crowding out other uses of the concept term, such as
Huntington’s. (Many of these joint concepts actually are initiated by service planners.)
The use of strategic vision could incorporate both service strategy and purpose while
avoiding semantic disputes; however, use of this term admittedly has not gained much
traction.
Even if one disagrees with the definitions used in this monograph, the objective of the
work is to identify “how to” craft strategy, so that aspiring (and current) strategists can
become better acquainted with what Moltke called expedients. In the real world, such
wisdom transcends disputes over exact definitions.

About the Author and Structure
Bruce Stubbs’s career as a naval strategist began with his admission to the U.S. Coast
Guard Academy in the class of 1970 and was reinforced by his graduation from the Naval War College in 1991, having earned the degree of master of arts in national security
and strategic studies, with distinction.
As a Coast Guard officer, Stubbs specialized in national security operations, commencing his close association with the U.S. Navy as an exchange division officer in USS Badger
(DE 1072), seeing combat action in the Vietnam War. He qualified as a USN surface warfare officer and successfully completed the Cold War–era Tactical Action Officer School.
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During his rise to the rank of captain, U.S. Coast Guard, his assignments included being
a member of the National Security Council staff—a position involving much crafting
of strategy; military aide to the commandant of the Coast Guard (the chief of staff of
the service); commanding officer of the national security cutter USCGC Harriet Lane
(WMEC 903); and commandant of cadets at the Coast Guard Academy. His last activeduty tour was as assistant Coast Guard commandant for capability, in which he was
program manager for the Coast Guard’s operational forces: 275 ships, two thousand
boats, 220 aircraft, and 188 multimission coastal stations. Along with staff, he developed the operational requirements for the Coast Guard’s multibillion-dollar Integrated
Deepwater System Project to recapitalize forty-nine major cutters, forty-one coastal
patrol boats, 220 aircraft, and all associated sensors and communications systems. He
also oversaw the fielding of armed Coast Guard helicopters, a seminal event in the Coast
Guard’s history.
Following his retirement from active duty, Stubbs worked as a national security analyst,
writer, and consultant for two corporations. Most of his work was on Coast Guard and
DoD issues.
After serving briefly with the Department of State as maritime security adviser to the
U.S. special envoy for Middle East security, he entered the Department of the Navy as
director of the office of the DoD Executive for Maritime Domain Awareness, joining
the ranks of the Senior Executive Service. He also served for five months as the Acting
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy.
Starting in 2011, he then served for five years as deputy director of the Navy’s Strategy
and Policy Division (OPNAV N51B), and then director of the reorganized Strategy
Division (OPNAV N50). Currently he manages the same portfolio of naval strategy and
policy development as director of the Strategy and Strategic Concepts Division (OPNAV
N72S), a successor organization.
Ten years of directly leading and supervising the Navy’s top strategic-planning teams,
along with his previous experiences in personally crafting strategy, motivated Stubbs
to develop and deliver a briefing on his observations to inform a wide audience of the
particulars of naval strategy development, especially for naval officers preparing to
fill strategic-planning billets. Going through a series of revisions, updates, improvements, and expansions, his brief has been presented frequently over the past five years at
strategy conferences and seminars, most recently at the Naval War College in 2019. The
briefing always has represented an unofficial and personal (although obviously very well
informed) view, completely unclassified, and never purporting to embody official Navy
policies. As noted in the series introduction, this is an individual contribution to which
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the standard disclaimer applies: the views expressed are those of the authors and editors
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government.
The true strength of the briefing is in its personal and unofficial nature, containing observations and recommendations that simply neither can be found in academic texts on
strategy nor are taught in DoD strategy-planning courses. As repeatedly noted, Stubbs’s
briefing adds a discussion of the “expediencies” of strategy development into what
largely has been a theoretical study of efficient procedures or of history in far hindsight.
It adds the wisdom obtained in fresh makings of the sausage.
This monograph is structured around the briefing, presenting the briefing slides along
with an expanded explanatory text. The author obtained permission for the use of the
images contained in the slides from their originators. The intent is to capture the visual
impact of the briefing while providing written detail as well. Many individuals learn
better through visual graphics than through text; others learn more by means of text.
This monograph tries to combine both, retaining the spirit of the oral briefing yet providing greater permanence to the briefing’s wisdom. The briefing also hereby is made
more accessible. An additional goal is to put the briefing in context with other resources
on strategy, which prompted the creation of the included annotated bibliography.

Using the Monograph
In the spirit of the great Chinese sages of war, such as Sun-tzu (or those who wrote in
his name), Crafting Naval Strategy could be subtitled The Forty-Four Recommendations
for Effective Strategy Development. There is, in fact, an ancient Chinese text on warfare
entitled The Thirty-Six Stratagems, with the number thirty-six originally being a metaphor for “numerous.”20 As in other traditional texts, each entry in The Thirty-Six Stratagems consists of a one-sentence proverb followed by a lengthier explanation. Similarly,
the entries in this monograph consist of a visual image (slide) and an explanation.
In whatever way one counts or separates the observations, examples, and recommen
dations that Stubbs provides—whether thirty, thirty-six, or forty-four—each entry can
be contemplated individually. The reader may weigh its validity and choose to reject
that particular recommendation without having to reject the overall work. The crafting of any particular strategy occurs at a specific point in time in a specific political
environment; not every recommendation may fit the exact circumstance in which the
crafting is done. Additional “expediencies” may be placed on the strategist, which may
preclude the adoption of any particular recommendation. Yet the whole remains an
education in the art of the craft, as it is practiced in the present and will be in the immediate future.
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Ultimately, that is the goal in publishing this Black Book—to help “complete” the
education of future naval strategists (and renew the thinking of current strategists)
in the practical realities of fulfilling their task successfully. It is not a rejection of
more-theoretical, -detailed, or -scholarly texts, but rather is meant as a supplement
for academic programs and self-study.
If but one individual remembers but one of the “stratagems” explained herein when first
sitting down to draft or revise a strategy, then the monograph will have been of value.
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Proceedings 80/5/615 (May 1954), pp. 483–93.
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Crafting Naval Strategy
Observations and Recommendations for the Development of Future Strategies
bruce b. stubbs

Observation 1

Cover source: © by Condé Nast Publications. Used by permission.

All my comments flow from personal observations, but that is appropriate. The genesis
of all effective strategies occurs within the minds of individuals. The drafting of a
strategy may involve a team of researchers, thinkers, and writers, but the truly innovative ideas come out of group discussions only rarely. The group may develop, reinforce,
and strengthen those ideas further through conversation and debate; however, the
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principal or fundamental idea guiding any strategic concept inevitably is the product of
the personal study, education, contemplation, and experience of an individual strategist.
Thought leader is a term used frequently to describe such a person, particularly in laudatory introductions and résumés. To some it is a grandiose term, but it is appropriately
descriptive.
The standard caveat applies to this publication: these are my personal observations and
do not necessarily represent the official views of the Department of Defense (DoD) or
the Department of the Navy. Yet that caveat also applies to the generating thought of
any strategy; the final, official document, signed or released by the proper authority,
represents an official view, whereas a strategy in the process of development does not.
I have been by position a thought leader in the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the
Department of the Navy, as well as a student of strategy and history by avocation and
passion. In providing these observations, I rely on over thirty years of experience in
the development of strategic documents, including five years as the deputy director of
strategy and policy on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and then
five more years as the director, during both stints as a member of the Senior Executive
Service. Throughout this period, my position title, division designator, and relevant
organizational chart have been adjusted, but the job has remained: to lead the drafting
of plans and policies that direct service-wide decision-making and outline the objectives
of the organization in a particular time and situation.
Time and situations change, and that is why effective strategy changes. These observations focus on the construction and production of naval strategies, not on the merits of a
particular maritime or sea power strategy. During my ten years at OPNAV, I have served
four Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) and have had active and direct participation
in the production of the following three capstone Navy service strategies (or strategic
visions, as the introduction calls them):
•

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready
(2015)—an unclassified, tri–Sea Service document

•

The Navy Strategy (2018)—a classified, U.S. Navy–only strategy

•

The Naval Strategy (2020)—a classified and unclassified, tri–Sea Service document

Each of these strategic visions was designed for a particular situation—a problem set,
one might call it—in which the U.S. Navy needed first to determine and then to explain
how it could contribute most effectively and efficiently to the national security of the
United States, identifying Navy objectives and the manner in which they would be
achieved. Sometimes, of course, those objectives are not achieved before the situation
changes. In this monograph, I will not debate the merits of the strategic visions to which
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I have contributed but will outline elements of the craft applicable to the process of
determining and explaining how the U.S. Navy could contribute most effectively and
efficiently to the national security of the United States.
Within OPNAV, this process includes the development of Navy input for the production
of U.S. national-security strategy documents, such as the National Defense Strategy and
National Military Strategy, as well as the drafting of other internal Navy strategic documents such as the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014–2030, the Navy Strategic Plan series,
the Navy’s “Strategic Laydown and Dispersal Plan,” and the first USN-USCG National
Fleet Plan.
Prior to this assignment, in another life, I was one of the five principal authors of the
first National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005), signed by President George W.
Bush, as well as the principal author of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Maritime Strategy for
Homeland Security, the Coast Guard’s first National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain
Awareness, the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship,
and the first edition of Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian. The common element in all these experiences is the knowledge and skill
sets that the individual participants brought to the process.
Since my goal is to pass along the accumulated knowledge and experience in the
crafting of strategy to those who will perform this task in the future, it is appropriate to
acknowledge the importance and intellectual independence of the individual strategist.

Observation 2

Graphic source: Blue Diamond Group. Used by permission.
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What follows are the realities that need to be kept in mind always:
All strategy statements are political documents. Whatever their form, all strategy
statements are political documents that reflect accommodations, compromises, agendas
both overt and hidden, and prejudices. As the introduction refers to them, these factors
are the expedients. Kori N. Schake, a scholar and former government official, writes that
“[s]trategy divorced from politics leads either to irrelevance, because the strategy will
not be employed, or disaster, when political leaders are confronted with the unexpected
costs and consequences.”1
Decision makers are subject to huge time demands. Senior leaders are caught up in pressing matters of the day and have limited time to reflect on weighty, long-term issues. This
results in what might be called the difference between strategic thinking and strategy
thinking. Many senior leaders engage in strategy thinking, in that they contemplate
plans to solve the pressing matters, which may range from putting together a service’s
budget for the coming fiscal year to determining how to counter current gray-zone
activity. Few have the time or inclination to engage in the type of long-range, servicedefining, “every assumption on the table” strategic thinking that is necessary for the
craft of drafting a (reasonably) enduring strategic vision.
Everyone is a strategist. Col. Jobie S. Turner, USAF, expounds on this theme, noting the
reality that “[i]n the Pentagon everyone fancies themselves a strategist. Every graduate
of professional military education, every contractor with a new weapon system, every
think-tank or consultancy pundit: all feel that if they were only given the chance, they
could impose order with the right ‘big idea.’ Meanwhile, . . . ‘the programmers’ smile,
content in their view that the budgets they build are the real strategy.”2
The staffing process dulls all strategies. This reality is in keeping with observation 1.
Although innovative ideas start with the individual strategist, the addition of others
during the staffing process necessarily affects those ideas. At best, the staffing process knocks off the rough edges and protects the interests of the decision makers from
dangerous currents, ensuring that the strategy is more in keeping with their objectives;
at worst, the tumbling and polishing of the ideas wear them down to almost nothing.
As much as the individual strategic thinker might bewail the staffing process, this is the
reality for many such projects.
Many of what pass for service strategies are really plans. Owing to the Goldwater-Nichols
Act defense reforms (1986), the Naval Services no longer produce strategies such as the
famous Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, which drove war and operations planning.3 Here
I must confess that I disagree with the author of the introduction, who believes that such
production is still possible. Yes, the services still must articulate how they intend to fight
their service, but that articulation is more for force-development purposes than for actual
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force-employment purposes. Consequently, what passes today for Naval Service strategies
are more in keeping with strategic plans or strategic concepts than pure military strategies that define the required military conditions for achieving national objectives.

Observation 3

Image source: DoD Imagery Library.

Before you immediately plunge into drafting a strategy, you need to spend your time answering the five basic W questions of journalism: who, what, where, when, and why. This
will ensure a solid foundation as you go forward. “[D]efining the 5Ws first [will open]
more avenues to talk about the ideas and concepts and also [result] in more buy-in from
the [staffs]. . . . It sounds simple, but Simon Sinek is right: start with why.”4 Analyzing
the who, what, where, when, and why allows for identifying the problems that create the
need for a strategy, the knowledge of which is the starting point for framing the strategy’s
objectives and determining the best way to craft it.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, USA
(2011–15), drove home this point at his 2011 confirmation hearing with his reference to a
quote attributed to Einstein. “[I]f you have an hour to save the world, spend 55 minutes of it
understanding the problem and five minutes of it trying to solve it. And I think sometimes,
in particular as a military culture, we don’t have that ratio right. We tend to spend 55 minutes trying to [figure out] how to solve the problem and five minutes understanding it.”5

20  leidos chair of future warfare studies

I advise all teams of crafters to start their project with an inclusive session to hammer
out agreement on the five Ws. The dividend on this investment will pay out in almost every later phase of the project. It is a very effective means of building an initial
framework.

Observation 4

Strategy is one of the most misunderstood leadership concepts today. There are countless definitions. Here are just two:
•

In the academic model, strategy can be about creating power. Sir Lawrence D.
Freedman asserts that, to be a true strategy, there must be a dynamic challenge to
overcome. “Strategy is required when others might frustrate one’s plans because
they have different and possibly opposing interests and concerns.” In differentiating
between plans and strategies, Freedman maintains that “a plan supposes a sequence
of events that allows one to move with confidence from one state of affairs to another”—that is, being able to carry out an action without opposition. Strategies are
needed because, as Freedman quotes boxer Mike Tyson, “everyone has a plan ’til they
get punched in the mouth.”6 Effective strategy anticipates the punch and has a plan
for deflecting it (or recovering from it, or both) and continuing one’s intended action.

•

In the business model, a strategy can be about moving an organization forward in
a shifting environment. A strategy is required because a change in the operating
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environment (emergence of competition, changing regulations, etc.) will not allow
operations to be carried out in the same manner as before with an equal degree
of success. Strategy is not about “business as usual.” Richard P. Rumelt defines a
“good strategy” as one that “honestly acknowledges the challenges being faced and
provides an approach to overcome them. . . . Bad strategy tends to skip over pesky
details such as problems. It ignores the power of choice and focus.”7
The crafting of a strategy document requires choosing a definition from among the
many available—a recognition that leads to observation 5.

Observation 5

Graphic source: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Used by permission.

It has been my personal experience that the best approach in starting to draft any
strategy is to use the ends-ways-means formula (others alter the order to ways-meansends to reflect a bottom-up approach). For the purposes of developing naval strategy, it
is “ultimately best understood as the interaction of three things, all within the context
of risk assessment.”8 These are as follows:
•

Ends—the goals or objectives that the strategic actor seeks to achieve

•

Ways—the strategic actor’s plan of action for using the means available

•

Means—the resources available to the strategic actor

Constructing a strategy with ends, ways, and means provides a clear, easy-to-follow
train of logic.
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The risk-assessment context includes an honest assessment of the assumptions the strategists are using to initiate the ends-ways-means construct. As Colin S. Gray advises,
“To this fundamental triptych of ends, ways and means, it is advisable to insist upon
adding the vital ingredient of ASSUMPTIONS. This fourth element is always important
and typically reigns unchallenged as the greatest source of mischief for entire strategic
enterprises.”9
The ends-ways-means formulation has become the semiofficial approach of DoD,
reflected in joint documents and echoed in professional and policy journals. It is logical;
it is easy to understand; it is not dependent on the elegance of the narrative; and it
makes decision makers feel they are in charge of the effort (since, presumably, they have
set the ends). “[A]ny strategy worth the name should articulate a clear set of achievable
goals; identify concrete threats to those goals; and then, given available resources, recommend the employment of specific instruments to meet and overcome those threats.”10
As then-CJCS Adm. Michael G. Mullen, USN (2007–11), wrote in the foreword of the
public National Military Strategy of the United States 2011, “The purpose of this document is to provide the ways and means by which our military will advance our enduring
national interests as articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy and to accomplish
the defense objectives [ends] in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.”11
Some critics question the ends-ways-means formula because the development of the
means—in this case, defense acquisition—appears disconnected from the identification
of the ends. A dismissive saying in DoD is that “amateurs discuss strategy; professionals discuss resources.” Arguably, defense acquisition programs do tend to take on lives
of their own, seemingly regardless of changes in strategy. However, the largest defense
programs take up to a decade to produce a system, making it logical that they survive
incremental changes in strategy. Despite changes in presidential administrations and
Congresses, American objectives do not swing wildly enough that most of these programs become irrelevant during their period of initial development.
Other critics charge that changes in technology drive strategy, not the other way
around. Indeed, emerging technology would seem to be another factor that would
influence the crafting of strategy, along with changes in the nature of the threat and the
overall security environment (which would include diffusion of emerging technologies).
Technology is thereby a driver in the same sense that all other geopolitical or geoeconomic factors are drivers.
Another criticism centers on the observation that “the United States goes to war with
the forces it has, not the forces it would like.” The implication is that changes in a
strategy rarely leave decision makers time to tailor the forces for its execution. However,
that assumes that strategic visions last only for the short term; this mistakes the words
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of (new) strategy documents for the strategies themselves. The United States produced
many strategic documents during the Cold War period, but the overall strategy rarely
swerved.
My view is that these criticisms do not invalidate ends-ways-means as an initial
approach. The strategy must connect available means to desired outcomes in creative
ways, and reduce the sought-after outcomes if ways cannot be found. A good strategy avoids mismatches among the ends, ways, and means. For instance, if the means
required to implement a strategy cannot be funded, then strategy must be revised by
changing the ends or the ways to reduce the risk by managing the mismatches and ensuring alignment. As Colin Gray notes: “Even though strategists and those they sought
to advise have been capable of adopting almost awesomely improbable assumptions, the
game has always had to be about ends, ways, and means.”12

Observation 6

Graphics source: Deposit Photos. Used by permission.

We tend to conflate strategy and planning. The essence of strategy is about making
choices and setting priorities, such as the famous Allied strategy of “Germany first” in
the Second World War. Strategy is what you want to do; your plan is how you actually
will do it.13 As U.S. Army War College professor Harry R. Yarger notes,
[t]he purpose of planning is to create certainty so that people and organizations can act. The purpose of strategy formulation is to clarify, influence, manage, or resolve the [volatility, uncertainty,
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complexity, and ambiguity] of the strategic environment through the identification and creation
of strategic effects in support of policy goals. Strategy lays down what is important and to be
achieved, sets the parameters for the necessary actions, and prescribes what the state is willing to
allocate in terms of resources. Thus, strategy, through its hierarchal nature, identifies the objectives
to be achieved and defines the box in which detailed planning can be accomplished—it bounds
planning.14

Columbia Business School professor William G. Pietersen cautions, “To be clear, planning is also important. But it is not a substitute for strategy. We don’t create a strategy
with a plan. We execute it with a plan. For example, your budget should be the financial
expression of your strategy, not the reverse. The right sequence is essential: strategy first, planning afterwards.”15 As noted in observation 5, however, there are those
involved in DoD resource planning who might dispute that “your budget should be the
financial expression of your strategy, not the reverse.” They would be wrong, of course.
This is why I raise what might seem to others merely an “issue of semantics.” There will
be those outside the strategy-crafting process who will want to ensure that their “plan”
(such as an acquisition proposal to solve a particular war-fighting problem) is incorporated into the strategy. A firm insistence on the difference between strategies and plans
might help mitigate such assaults.

Observation 7

Graphics source: BigStock Free Images. Used by permission.
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In their analysis of past Navy strategies, Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), and Karin
Duggan of CNA maintain that “there are a range of reasons why strategies are written.”
(Some of them are listed on the slide above.) Historically, we have written Navy strategies for the three overarching purposes: to explain the need for the Navy, how the Navy
meets that need, and where the Navy is heading.16 The “other purposes” actually are
subsets of the big three; however, they can be examined individually to ascertain the
quality of a draft strategy. In fact, they collectively constitute an informal checklist that
crafters should use to analyze potential support for the draft strategy.
There is nothing nefarious about any of the individual other purposes. A naval strategy (like all military strategies) must conform in its basics to the guidance of civilian
authorities, as exemplified by the National Security Strategy (NSS). As I argue later,
the CNO is the Navy’s chief strategist, so advocating for his (or, eventually, her) ideas
and priorities clearly is part of the process leading to implantation of the strategy. This
requires the ideas to be translated into budget decisions.
Notably, one of the other purposes—signaling to potential competitors—has not been
prominent in recent years, yet it was one of the more significant purposes of the public
version of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. Arguably, the very existence of that particular strategy played a role in deterring the Soviet Union.

Observation 8

Images source: DoD Imagery Library.
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Despite the potential for the strategy to serve multiple purposes, you ultimately must
focus it on your intended primary audience. Most naval strategies are written primarily
for Congress; the Joint Staff (JS) / the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); and the
Executive Office of the President, particularly the Office of Management and Budget
and the staff of the National Security Council (NSC). The Navy wants these organizations to understand the need for the Navy, the challenges it faces, and what it requires
to support national defense. We want to ensure that the Navy’s contribution to national
security is understood, accepted, and supported by national-security decision makers
and policy makers, and by public national-security thought leaders (both inside and
outside government), so they will (1) make informed resource and policy decisions, and
(2) generate informed discussions concerning future decisions.
Sometimes Navy leadership will authorize other versions of the strategy, focused for
different audiences. Classified versions are tailored for Navy commands that need to
implement the requirements; unclassified versions may be tailored for sailors in the
fleet, the overall American public, or allies and partners; and other documents may be
used for these purposes as well. Meanwhile, the strategy can be publicized using publicrelations tools and public media.

Observation 9

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2019 (Washington, DC: 2019), p. 87.
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The paramount importance of understanding the dominant strategic problem is underscored by the following statement by Carl von Clausewitz: “The first, the supreme, the
most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is
to establish by that test [i.e., the fit with policy goals] the kind of war on which they are
embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to
its nature.”17
Professor Turner of the U.S. Air War College offers some very useful insights on the
value of a problem-based approach to strategy.
•

A key to developing a strategy is to focus on the dominant military problem.

•

“A problem-based approach to strategy offers several advantages.” A properly
defined military problem forces the Navy to decide what is important in
the future war-fighting environment. “In the absence of a clear problem
to solve, the future environment can become unwieldy.”

•

First, a “well-thought-out military problem constrains . . . intellectual
wandering,” keeping the Navy focused on what is important. “With a clear
problem, it’s easier to decide how the [Navy] orients itself.” In short, the military
problem keeps the Navy “grounded in reality, preventing bureaucratic inertia
from overwhelming [it].”

•

“Second, while aspirations are important, they must be backed by more[-]concrete,
specific objectives” and coherent solutions “to win public and congressional support
in the form of budgets.”

•

“Third, military problems force technological solutions into a supporting role. . . .
[A]s Colin Gray notes . . . , ‘Weaponry does not equal strategy.’ . . . When the problem comes first, however, the technology can come second.”

•

“Fourth, solving military problems harnesses the talent already on staff and their
recent operational experience. . . . With a clearly defined problem the inputs from
recent warfighting are much easier to capture or, when necessary, discard.”18

Two related but distinct problems on which strategies may focus are (1) force employment (such as in war plans) and (2) force development (such as resource decisions,
training, and acquisition).
The slides above and below (examples 1 and 2) illustrate force-employment problems.
If China decides to use force against Taiwan or Russia assaults its Baltic neighbors,
American forces likely would find themselves attempting to defend exposed territories
on the adversary’s doorstep. The United States would have to project decisive power over
thousands of miles, into areas where China and Russia can bring to bear capabilities
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more rapidly. Joint forces must be ready to fight large-scale combat operations in a joint,
multinational, multidomain environment, under the most demanding conditions.
Maritime formations must be capable of fighting through layers of enemy antiaccess
systems while operating in a degraded communications environment and under constant surveillance.
Obviously, force-deployment strategies must be based on the capabilities and employment
of joint forces, even if they describe only the naval component. Ultimately such strategies
require integration with joint planning and must be designed with that in mind. Additionally, they must be compatible with the projected contributions of allies and partners.

Source: Adapted and modified by OPNAV from “Sweden,” Tuesday’s World Events 2, Student News Daily, 23 January 2018,
www.studentnewsdaily.com/.

Although the ultimate goal of service strategies is the solution of real-world strategic
force-employment problems, they necessarily focus on force-development problems—
that is, how to man, train, equip, and prepare the forces necessary for the potential
employment. As noted before, the services are creating the means by which forceemployment problems can be solved—which actually requires a more complex,
intricate, nuanced, persuasive, and politically savvy strategy than the employment
problem, which assumes that the forces already exist and the decision to carry out
the action already has been made. Crafting a force-development strategy calls for the
greatest level of creativity.
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Observation 10

Graphic source: Jacek Filek. Used by permission.

An effective strategy is designed to solve an overarching problem in the international environment. That may be the rise of a potential aggressor or—as portrayed by
the unusual, triple-sided chessboard—two. But, along with the overarching problem,
there also are specific problems or issues. The problem, for the crafters of strategy, is
to be able to consider and, as necessary, address these subproblems while keeping the
overarching problem (and your goal) always in mind. In other words, one should not
let oneself become exhausted by an effort to solve every detail. Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de
Czege advocates the articulation of a theory of victory—a statement of the final outcome
of the strategy—to avoid being overwhelmed by the subproblems. He maintains that,
without such a theory of victory, “readers must infer a complex leap of logic to grasp the
concept’s military problem.”19
The term theory of victory is being used more frequently in defense literature, although
its definition remains vague and without common acceptance. Its users intend to
describe victory in terms of desired favorable political conditions after (and as a result
of) a military victory on the battlefield. Its prominence stems from the criticism that in
conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States and its allies achieved
a military success but did not achieve their expressed political objectives (promotion
of democracy, a peaceful Middle East, an end to terrorism, etc.). Presumably, a detailed
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theory of victory would help develop the full political-military strategy. For it to
do so, it has been argued, the force-employment strategy must rest on a very firm
force-development strategy so decision makers can understand what means (and limits)
they will have to achieve the political ends, as well as the military conditions needed to
secure those ends. The force-development strategy must come first; however, it too must
be crafted with future operational problems in mind, and it must rest on a full assessment of the future strategic and operational environment.

Observation 11

Professor Paul M. Kennedy of Yale came to public attention with the publication of his
1987 book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict
from 1500 to 2000, in which he argued that the United States was overreaching its
capabilities in the late Cold War; he predicted it would need to retrench. Of course, the
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, making Kennedy’s thesis seem less than prescient.
However, much of Kennedy’s earlier work was on the history of the Royal Navy and
the link between navies and geoeconomics. In Engineers of Victory (2013), Kennedy
rightly elevates the importance of technology and innovation (and innovators), but—on
a grander scale—he fully appreciates that “the winning of great wars always requires
superior organization.” Superior organizations “allow outsiders to feed fresh ideas into
the pursuit of victory.” An ingredient badly missing from the centralized systems of
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imperial Japan and Nazi Germany was the willingness—demonstrated again and again
by top Anglo-American military and political leaders—to share decision-making with
those of more modest rank who had greater expertise in tackling a particular problem
and were closer to the action. The result was that Allied military leaders “solved problems” of strategy; they did not simply fight battles. Arguably, they developed an effective
theory of victory.
One should adopt this problem-solving spirit in crafting strategy as well. If strategy, as
Freedman defines it, is a plan that needs to overcome opposition, then the crafters of
strategy need to take into consideration the obstacles the opposition creates and will
create. The analysts of the Allies were able to do this most effectively (and more quickly)
when the strategists had foreseen these obstacles. To develop a sense of what future
obstacles may be, the initial step is to examine the problem presented in military operations of the past.20

Observation 12

Image source: DoD Imagery Library.

Crafters need to remember that enduring operational challenges are created by the very
environment that determines the physical as well as the strategic limitations on naval
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forces. These must be accounted for in both force-development and force-employment
strategies.
Asymmetries in magazine capacities between shore bases and surface warships make
it challenging to project naval power against a first-class military power’s land-based
scouting and strike forces. This is so especially if the terrestrial forces are dispersed
and mobile, even if the fleet possesses its own extended-range air and missile forces.
But that does not mean it is impossible.
The extended ranges and high accuracies of shore-based weapons make surface ships
vulnerable to such missiles at distances ranging up to thousands of miles. In wartime,
a surface fleet may spend most of its time operating outside the range of the enemy’s
antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) maritime systems, then conduct periodic short-duration
dashes inside the A2/AD perimeter to launch strikes.
This is a situation—and operational advantage—that navies have possessed throughout
the history of naval operations projecting from the sea onto the land, and but one of a
number of enduring operational challenges (and advantages) that the crafter of strategy
needs to keep in mind. Strategies—of both development and employment—can incorporate these factors best by assigning to them comparative measures. In the situation
described, such comparative measures could include (1) the length of time a surfacestrike system can operate within the enemy’s A2/AD defenses before detection, (2) the
distances traveled into the enemy’s A2/AD zone before detection occurs (longer
distances yield a greater area that can be subjected to maritime strikes), and (3) the
ranges of U.S. strike aircraft and missiles (greater ranges yield shorter times and
distances for the ships to transit to accomplish their missions).
Comparative measures are effective tools for determining the ways of the endsways-means approach, and help remind crafters to incorporate recognitions of
the enduring challenges and opportunities.
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Observation 13

As previously noted, the term theory of victory can be somewhat confusing. There is
no formal DoD definition for it, but broadly it is a hypothesis of how a nation intends
to achieve strategic objectives during a conflict. It articulates how and why we think
our actions will work. Ultimately, we use military force to change other nations’ will
or wills. A theory of victory describes how we think our tactical- and operational-level
actions will lead to achieving our strategic-political objectives.
The United States was supreme at the tactical and operational levels in Vietnam, but
that dominance did not lead to a strategic or political victory. We had no successful
theory of victory to link tactical- and operational-level successes to political victory.
A theory of victory is the conceptual means of establishing clear ends in the ends-waysmeans equation. “Defining strategy in this manner gives us a tool for identifying a
strategy, analyzing the conceptual clarity and logic of the strategy, and assessing the
quality of the strategy. It provides a broad foundation from which all types of strategy
can be defined, analyzed, and assessed, including corporate strategy, grand strategy,
and military strategy.”21
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Observation 14

Graphic source: Central Idea Agency. Used by permission.

In addition (or perhaps as an alternative) to beginning with a theory of victory, drafters
of strategy should identify the central idea around which the document is to revolve. A
very valuable treatise on strategy issued by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence
states as follows:
•

“The innovative and compelling ‘big idea’ is often the basis of a new strategy.”

•

“A strategy which has no unifying idea is not a strategy.”

•

The central idea must bind the ends, ways, and means—and inspire others to
support it.

•

“In practice, the intent of all good strategies can be summed up in a page if not
even better—in a paragraph.”22

This is the most concise summary I have found concerning the need for a central idea
in any drafting of strategy.
Hollywood movies provide outstanding examples of how an entire production can be
built around a concisely stated central idea. The movie industry refers to a statement of
the central idea as a log line, as in the example below.
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This log line for the movie Jaws is one of the greatest of all time. It depicts the
overarching story line in an interesting, straightforward way, rather than focusing on
details that might seem meaningless without the context of the bigger picture. It captures the entirety of the plot—and thus the essence of what the audience will
experience—in a single sentence.
In communications, the human brain craves meaning before details. If the core message
of a strategy can be captured in a single sentence, there is a higher probability the strategy will be effective. As noted in one of the endnotes to the introduction, the overarching
American strategy during the Cold War can be summarized in one sentence: “to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union (and its influence) until the internal contradictions within communism bring about its own demise.” And that was what was achieved.
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Observation 15

*Prof. Michael E. Porter (Harvard Bus. Sch.), “Transforming Strategy: Creating Shared Value”

In recent years, access to the CNO for strategy development has been limited to the
Deputy CNO (DCNO) responsible for strategy and the CNO’s immediate personal
staff (which for strategy is OPNAV N-00Z, which functions like a commander’s action
group). Unfortunately, this relatively restricted access has a negative effect on the CNO’s
dissemination of his own central idea to his strategy staff. In reality, none of the three
CNOs whom I have had the pleasure of serving ever directly handed me his central idea
for a capstone strategy. Indeed, my office provided (often in retrospect) the central idea,
along with the ends, ways, and means, for each of the three capstone Navy strategies
that we developed. We actually received very little of what is commonly called “commander’s guidance” at the initial stages of any strategy production.
Professor Turner of the Army War College has commented on the need for the service
chief to play an active role. “[T]he process of producing strategic documents [can] be
inherently self-defeating. Even within a single service there are too many diverse views
and interests to overcome. Thus, we are left with the unappealing choice between a
worthless lowest-common denominator or substance doomed to immediate, reflexive
resistance from some segment of the institution.” He is right. If the CNO does not play
this role, then we do a lot of “rock management”—by which I mean that we haul forward
many “rocks” until one is identified as suitable for further sculpting.23
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The need for a central idea that emanates from an organization’s top decision maker
leads me to my next observation and example, about what happens if strategy crafting
begins with no central idea. In that case, one must be discovered after the fact, if the
strategy is going to be disseminated at all.

Observation 16

The production of the 2015 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21R)
posed two significant challenges for the crafters. (I know—I was one of them.)
•

First, no one—from the four-stars to the mess cooks and all those in between—initially offered a central idea. It was developed ex post facto when the writing team
was attempting to communicate the strategy. Consequently, CS21R has no explicit
central idea.

•

Second, the guidance for developing the framework for CS21R prevented the strategy
from receiving a three-chapter construct, with a chapter each dedicated to ends,
ways, and means—to work around the CNO’s prohibition against using the endsways-means construct explicitly. It was acceptable to use ends-ways-means as the
approach, but it was unacceptable to employ it publicly.
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Therefore, the writing team developed a construct around a four-step sequence, and
“buried” the ends, ways, and means in four chapters with the following themes:
•

The security environment

•

How to employ the force in response to the security environment

•

The Sea Services’ value and contribution to national defense

•

How to develop the force in response to the security environment

Reading through the document, one notes that there is no attempt to set
priorities, with the exception of the statement that the replacement program for
the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic-missile submarines, considered the nation’s
most secure strategic deterrent, was the U.S. Navy’s top acquisition priority. This sort
of explicit statement is missing from all other elements of CS21R. Therefore the
document ended up constituting more a list than a strategy.
This leads directly to the next observation, and another example of a difficult-toimplement strategy.

Observation 17
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The slide above illustrates the construct used for the unclassified Summary of the 2018
National Defense Strategy (Summary NDS) signed out by the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF). Although its language is unusually clear, the Summary NDS identifies
twelve objectives, six critical challenges, eight operational problems, and ten investment priorities requiring Department of Defense—and Navy—attention. With so many
imperatives from which to choose, attempting to prioritize a Navy budget on the basis
of these broad and sometimes competing priorities can resemble traversing a minefield.
The profusion of priorities allows the process of developing a budget to devolve into a
“buzzword bingo” justification of desired capabilities, or the “cherry-picking” of desired
imperatives. The twelve objectives are as follows (shortened for brevity): defending the
homeland from attack; sustaining joint-force military advantages; deterring adversaries
from aggression; enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and
interests; maintaining favorable regional balances of power; defending allies and fairly
sharing responsibilities for common defense; bolstering partners against coercion; dissuading, preventing, or deterring actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction;
preventing terrorist operations; ensuring that common domains remain open; continuously delivering performance with affordability and speed as we change the departmental mind-set, culture, and management systems; and establishing an unmatched
twenty-first-century national-security innovation base.
Note that the twelve objectives are themselves somewhat confused, blending together
as they do force-development and force-employment objectives, as well as objectives
that range from nuclear deterrence to the establishment of an innovation base. Moreover, while the unclassified ends use the verbs defend and deter, none of the objectives
uses the verbs defeat or destroy, despite the fact that they are implied throughout the
document. The Summary NDS tends to be a little short on explaining the sourcing of
resources to achieve its objectives, and the later publication within the Pentagon of the
2020 Defense Planning Guidance—the document intended to link strategy to capabilities
(i.e., to develop the means)—only adds to the confusion.
The results of such a process are lists of goals, not an effective strategy.
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Observation 18

According to Samuel Huntington, the strategy—or, in Huntington’s words, the strategic
concept—must explain the Navy’s role in implementing national security. It must
describe how, when, and where the Navy expects to protect the nation. Without a
strategy or a strategic concept of the Navy’s role, the public and political leaders will be
(1) confused about the role of the Navy—uncertain whether its existence is necessary—
and (2) apathetic to Navy requests for additional resources.
Note again Huntington’s use of the term strategic concept, not strategy. As Huntington
uses it, strategic concept is similar to the term value proposition, and relates to what the
introduction describes as the strategic vision. Again, this is much different from what
the Joint Staff considers to be a concept.
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What follows below is an expanded description of the Navy’s value proposition.
U.S. naval forces can be visible or invisible, large or small, provocative or peaceful,
depending on what serves American interests best. The sight of a single U.S. warship in
the harbor of a friend can serve as tangible evidence of close relations between the United
States and that country or their commitment to each other. American naval forces can
modulate their presence to exert the kind and degree of influence best suited to resolve
the situation, whatever it is, in a manner compatible with U.S. interests. In a crisis in
which force might be required to protect U.S. interests or evacuate U.S. nationals, but
where visibility could provoke the outbreak of hostilities, American naval forces can
remain out of sight, over the horizon, but ready to respond in a matter of minutes.
U.S. naval forces do not have to rely on prior international agreements before taking a position beyond a coastal state’s territorial sea in an area of potential crisis; U.S. naval forces
do not have to request overflight authorization or diplomatic clearance. By remaining on
station in international waters, for indefinite periods, naval forces communicate a capability for action that ground or air forces can duplicate only by landing or entering sovereign airspace. U.S. naval forces can be positioned near potential trouble spots without the
political entanglement associated with the employment of land-based forces.
Although bases on foreign soil can be valuable, U.S. naval forces do not require them
in the way that land-based ground and air forces do. Ships are integral units that carry
with them much of their own support, and through mobile logistics support they can
be maintained on forward stations for long durations. U.S. naval forces, moreover, are
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relatively immune to the politics of host-nation governments, whereas those governments can constrain operations by land-based forces significantly. As the U.S. military
base structure overseas has diminished over recent decades, the ability of naval forces
to arrive in an area fully prepared to conduct sustained combat operations has taken on
added importance.

Observation 19

Graphic source: Inc. This Morning. Used by permission.

We all know the military dictum to “keep it simple” (the KISS principle). “The strength
of any strategy lies in its simplicity,” Professor Pietersen notes, before quoting Carl von
Clausewitz: “Simplicity in planning fosters energy in execution. Strong determination in
carrying through a simple idea is the surest route to success. The winning simplicity we
seek, the simplicity of genius, is the result of intense mental engagement.” “A strategy,”
Professor Pietersen continues, “must be distilled into the simplest language possible so
that everyone in an organization can follow it. Complexity paralyzes. Simplicity empowers. Simplicity is not a short cut; it’s hard work—requiring the kind of intense mental
engagement Clausewitz emphasizes.”24
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Observation 20

The essence of strategy is the making of hard choices. Unfortunately, most strategies,
especially at the unclassified level, studiously avoid making hard choices; however, the
reality of finite resources forces us to make these choices.
Listed below are several classic choices that strategists face that you should address early
in your production process:
•

State which objectives are not going to be pursued

•

Describe how and where risk will be accepted

•

Establish a pecking order for resources to achieve objectives

Observation 21

Graphic source: Deposit Photos, Inc. Used by permission.
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Naval senior leaders tend to spend their days in meetings, at conferences, giving
testimony, speaking at engagements, on travel, and so on. This is not by choice—
their positions demand it. Our leaders are burdened with such busy schedules that they
frequently cannot dedicate the time necessary to apply their years of experience to
thinking big, strategic thoughts.
Therefore, you need to find white space for your bosses to reflect on big, strategic
thoughts. They want it, and they will thank you for it (eventually!). At the same time,
these leaders need to make time consciously to meet with and give guidance to their
crafters (providing them with the central idea, at least)—that is, if they want to have
an impact on the Navy beyond the day-to-day management of their assignment.

Observation 22

Doctrine provides fundamental principles that guide military forces, it tends to be
enduring—and it is not relevant to a strategy document. From 1970 to 2018, naval
strategies included doctrinal descriptions of naval core functions. This is no longer
the case, as these core functions, along with attributes, have been published in the
2020 Naval Doctrine Publication 1. Preferred now is an emphasis on current forceemployment problems in the context of the joint force—which precludes, or at least
crowds out, much emphasis on describing core attributes.
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However, those who prefer to see Navy strategy as a strategic vision or a strategic concept
argue that key elements of doctrine must be included.25 Doctrinal functions that have
been used in previous Navy strategies are listed in the figure below.

It is apparent that functions remained largely the same, regardless of the details
of our strategy. Note also that the enduring functions are deterrence, sea control, power
projection, and forward presence, although there were changes at the following key
inflection points:
•

1992: fall of USSR, drawdown

•

2006: counterterrorism emphasis

•

2015: increasing proliferation of A2/AD technologies

46  leidos chair of future warfare studies

Observation 23

Images source: CC0 Public Domain.

Forecasting the future is extremely difficult; much is unknown and even unknowable.
Yet it is a task that strategists must embrace, since, in military matters, the expected—
precisely because it is expected—is not to be expected. Colin Gray’s advice is relevant.
What we expect, we plan and provide for, and thus deter. What does happen is what we
did not deter, because we did not plan and provide for it, because we did not expect it.
Hence the need for flexible and adaptable strategies to address the so-called black swan
event, such as the coronavirus pandemic we faced in 2020 and now in 2021.

Mark P. Mills, review of After Shock: The World’s Foremost Futurists Reflect on 50 Years of Future Shock and Look Ahead to the Next
50, ed. John Schroeter, Wall Street Journal, 1 April 2020.
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Here is another penetrating quote from Colin Gray.
You cannot predict the future, so do not try, and do not be tempted to believe that there is some
wonderful methodology that will enable you to see into the twenty-first century. There is not. How
do you prepare for, perhaps against, future warfare? It needs to be done, so complaining about the
impossible is of little use. Often a nation’s geography and recent past provide reliable guidance as
to its future enemies. The domain of uncertainty can be distressingly large, however. If you are not
blessed, or cursed, with a dominant enemy, the path of prudence is to cover all major possibilities
as well as possible, without becoming overcommitted to one particular category of danger. The
temptation is to assert that flexibility and adaptability are not policies, certainly not strategies.
Nonetheless, they are often the basis for defense planning when the time, place, and identity of
enemies are unknown, or at least uncertain.
Expect to be surprised. To win as a defense planner is not to avoid surprise. To win is to have
planned in such a manner that the effects of surprise do not inflict lethal damage. The fundamental
reason why we can be surprised tends not to be the sudden emergence of novel factors of menace—
for example, an asteroid that threatens to extinguish life on Earth—but rather the consequences of
known trends that interact in unexpected ways, resulting in unanticipated consequences.26

1940 graphic source: IMDb Free Images. Used by permission. 1950 graphic source: DoD Imagery Library.

The Ministry of Defence’s strategy treatise also notes the following:
[S]trategist[s] will never know everything about the environment in which their strategy is
designed to achieve [its ends]. Nor will they be able to predict the unintended consequences once
their strategy starts to be implemented. It therefore follows that strategists need to be comfortable
planning on the basis of incomplete information. Because of this, they need to recognise that,
despite their best efforts, outcomes are far from certain and therefore good feedback loops to ensure
they are sighted on what is happening once a strategy has entered the implementation phase are important, as is being prepared to adapt the strategy as necessary to achieve the desired end-state. . . .
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. . . Because we cannot anticipate every eventuality or predict the unexpected, strategists should aim
to keep a reserve of everything (effort, resources, time). Even after considering all the risks, being
prepared for events to take an entirely unexpected turn is the embodiment of strategic flexibility
and adaptability. . . .
. . . One way of helping to overcome this [issue] is the establishment of a formal “red team” with the
remit of testing a fledgling strategy against a range of potential scenarios, including the “unthinkable” ones. To be effective, the leader of the “red team” needs to have direct access to the strategy
owner and the confidence to speak honestly. . . . [I]ncluding experts from outside government in the
“red team” (including academics and other subject matter experts) should be considered.27

Observation 24

Images source: DoD Imagery Library.

Well-articulated spatial content, with geographic arguments supported by charts, helps
strategists present a more effective case to their audience. In a strategy document,
always choose to use maps rather than images of ships, aircraft, and personnel. Many
of the latter type of images, often used in “slick and glossy” versions of Navy strategy
documents, bear little direct relationship to the accompanying text. Maps, on the other
hand, are explanatory tools that clarify the text directly. Two historical examples illustrate their efficacy.
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Map image provided by Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).

Charts displayed from unique perspectives, such as this one of the first and second
island chains from China’s perspective, can give a greater appreciation of geography,
distances, and proximity.

Images source: Library of Congress.
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This second example points to the importance of being able to visualize geography, to
understand its implications better. “In December 1942 U.S. Army Chief of Staff George
Marshall [1939–45], acting on a suggestion from General Dwight Eisenhower, sent identical fifty-inch, 750-pound globes to [Winston S.] Churchill and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt as Christmas presents. During the war [the globes were] especially useful to Roosevelt, Churchill, and others for gauging relative distances over water, a crucial factor
in allocating scarce shipping resources while planning grand strategy.”28 As writer on
geopolitics Nicholas J. Spykman reminds us, “States cannot escape their geography.
However skilled the Foreign Office, and however resourceful the General Staff, a state’s
foreign policy must reckon with geographic facts. It can deal with them skillfully or
ineptly; it can modify them; but it cannot ignore them. For geography does not argue. It
simply is.”29

Observation 25

Image source: DoD Imagery Library.

Almost every book on strategy insists that the crafters need to meet with the top
leadership / chief executive officer (CEO) to ensure that guidance is direct and clear.
As discussed earlier, this often is difficult. Yet it is imperative that the strategists have
some degree of direct access if their efforts are to yield an approved, effective result

crafting naval strategy   51

that the leadership is committed to executing. An initial meeting should be held at the
beginning of the project. Frequent and unimpeded access is needed to accomplish the
following:
•

Implement CNO guidance—not guidance altered by the agendas of the OPNAV
directorates

•

Provide unfiltered advice to the CNO, especially alternative views

•

Proceed quickly and with a minimum of interference from others

•

Ensure linkage between the strategy and the program objective memorandum
(known as a POM), other elements of the resource-development, force-capabilities,
and force-development processes, all of which the CNO directs (the strategists/
crafters need to remind the CNO of this necessary linkage)

•

Ensure that the CNO receives Navy strategy products that reflect a consistent and
aligned set of principles, concepts, and tenets regarding the Navy’s fundamental role
in implementing national policy

In his guidance to the drafters of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, then-SECDEF
James N. Mattis (2017–18) stated, “As a practical matter, strategy cannot be built by a
large group process. [OSD and the JS will lead a small team reporting directly to me.]
. . . I will be personally involved in this effort. . . . The team will provide interim products. . . . These products may be provocative, as any good strategy requires hard choices.
I expect you to review these as a means to genuine debate.”30
Almost every defense official has expressed and expresses similar sentiments, but that
does not mean they are translated into direct meetings with their strategists. Given the
time constraints the senior leader (in this case, the CNO) faces, as previously discussed,
the “front office” (which manages time and appointments) is unlikely to initiate an invitation. So the initiative to meet with the CNO must come from the crafters themselves
(or their immediate boss), and they figuratively may have to “fight for it.” However, such
fighting is necessary if the crafters are to do their work efficiently and avoid becoming
overwhelmed by frustration and cynicism.
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Observation 26

Words count, and words convey concepts. Crafters of strategy need to strive for
clear and precise terminology that all can understand easily, and to avoid using
the buzzwords of the day—which usually become dated rapidly.
Additionally, crafters need to define the terms they emphasize, either within the context
of the document or by attaching a glossary. If terms are not defined, their usage cannot
be clear. Lack of definitions causes ambiguity and confusion. For example, a naval
definition of presence can be interpreted by others as posture.
Therefore, be precise in your language, choose your words carefully, and define your
terms to avoid confusion. Never assume that anyone will read the document with a
copy of the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP-1) opened alongside.
(In any case, JP-1 barely scratches the surface of the totality of such terms.)
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Observation 27

Images in the left column source: Air Ministry, Second World War Official Collection. Used with permission. Map above left source:
Caliyah Alston, “Battles of World War II,” Sutori, www.sutori.com/. Map above right source: “Operation Barbarossa: The German
Invasion of the Soviet Union,” English Online, www.english-online.at/.

The first example for this observation is a strategic choice that led to victory.
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Royal Air Force (RAF) developed
an air-defense network that would provide it a critical advantage in the Battle of
Britain—with global strategic consequences. RAF Fighter Command brought together technology that included radar, ground defenses, observers, antiaircraft artillery,
fusion/directional centers, and fighter aircraft into a unified system of defense. Despite
extreme resource limitations, the RAF got its force-employment and force-development
strategies right by concentrating on a system of systems for air defense versus
offensive-bombing force-employment and force-development strategies. The defeat of
Germany’s Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain ensured the preservation of a secure
base for future offensive operations, which had profound strategic consequences.
Colin Gray notes the following:
Tactical mistakes may kill you today, while operational error may prove fatal in days or perhaps
weeks. The contrast with strategic error can hardly be clearer. A strategic error in statecraft or strategy may take years to reveal itself in its full horror. . . .
. . . [T]he Battle of Britain [was] waged briefly in the sky largely over southern England in August
and September 1940. This battle, the first of its kind in history, was tactically and operationally
momentous, but its ultimate significance has to be judged strategic. This battle, which of course
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Germany lost, required Hitler to leave Britain uninvaded in 1940, and, given his race against his
own mortality, to make the conquest of the USSR the next task on Nazi Germany’s path of conquest.
Failure in a single campaign in 1940 was to have consequences in shaping the entire rest of the war.
This fact highlights admirably what is meant by the adjective strategic. The sequence of events from
1941 until 1945, and then the East-West political and military standoff until as late as 1991, was all
in traceably logical part a result of German failure over England in Fall 1940.31

Images source: DoD Imagery Library.

Two naval examples from the Second World War reveal strategic choices that were made
to ensure peacetime prestige but resulted in wartime defeat. We have only to look at this
historical record to underscore the value of getting the strategy right.
•

The Imperial Japanese Navy squandered its budget on monstrous battleships, such
as the oil-guzzling Yamato and Musashi, instead of building destroyer escorts for
convoy protection. The result was that the USN submarine force shut down the
transport of raw materials to Japan.

•

Nazi Germany’s Kriegsmarine pursued useless and wasteful battleships, such as
Tirpitz and Bismarck, instead of a true transoceanic submarine for interdiction of
Atlantic sea lines of communication.

These were colossal strategic failures—they produced forces irrelevant to the fight
and unaffordable to the budget. Planning requirements for thirty years down the road
may seem unrealistic; however, in many instances, tomorrow’s requirements resemble
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today’s. A hedge against changes in technology and the geostrategic environment is
ensuring a degree of flexibility in your platforms.

Images source: DoD Imagery Library.

According to military historian Sir Michael E. Howard, everyone usually gets it
wrong at the beginning of a war. He observes, “In 1914, every army of all the
belligerent powers shared a common doctrine of the dominance of the offensive
and the inevitability of rapid and decisive campaigns. All navies believed in the
dominant role of the capital ship.”32 Yet the war on the ground developed into a
defensive stalemate, and it was the U-boat, not capital warships, that dominated
the naval war and affected the resupply of Britain and Russia.
The point, Howard continues, is not to be right at the outset—an almost impossible
task—but to be able to change as a war unfolds. “In these circumstances where
everybody starts wrong, the advantage goes to the side which can most quickly
adjust itself to the new and unfamiliar environment and learn from its mistakes.”
The goal is to develop the “capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.”33
In my view, the U.S. Navy’s choice to continue post-WWII development and upgrades
of aircraft carrier aviation ensured its global dominance. Symbolically, USS Midway
(CV 41) was an example of getting it right and being able to adjust capabilities as the
character of war changed. The ship operated for an unprecedented forty-seven years,
spanning from World War II to Desert Storm, from a straight flight deck with piston
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aircraft to an angled flight deck with jet aircraft. Like the follow-on large-deck carriers,
it was versatile and adaptable.

Observation 28

Image source: Elisabeth Bumiller, “We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint,” New York Times, 27 April 2010.

General Mattis was spot-on when he stated that “PowerPoint makes us stupid” at
a 2010 military conference.
Elisabeth Bumiller wrote the following in the New York Times in 2010:
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the leader of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, was
shown a PowerPoint slide in Kabul last summer [2009] that was meant to portray the complexity
of American military strategy, but looked more like a bowl of spaghetti.
“When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war,” General McChrystal dryly remarked. . . .
. . . Brig. Gen. H. R. McMaster, who banned PowerPoint presentations when he led the successful
effort to secure the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar in 2005, . . . liken[ed] PowerPoint to an internal
threat.
“It’s dangerous because it can create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of control,”
General McMaster said in a telephone interview [in 2010]. “Some problems in the world are not
bullet-izable.”
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In General McMaster’s view, PowerPoint’s worst offense is not a chart like the spaghetti graphic
. . . but rigid lists of bullet points (in, say, a presentation on a conflict’s causes) that take no account
of interconnected political, economic and ethnic forces. “If you divorce war from all of that, it
becomes a targeting exercise.” . . .
. . . Imagine lawyers presenting arguments before the Supreme Court in slides instead of legal
briefs.34

Unfortunately, PowerPoint briefings have become the required means of dialogue in the
Department of Defense. Yet the crafting of strategy must go far beyond that medium,
even if the crafters are required to prepare progress reports in its format.

Observation 29

Graphic source: DreamsTime Free Images. Used by permission.

A strategy that cannot be communicated effectively is an ineffective strategy. The
crafters of strategy not only bear a responsibility to make it understandable but must
take the lead in building a strategic communications plan. You never can rely wholly
on outside specialists (such as public affairs officers) to come up with a strategic communications plan. They simply do not know the strategy as intimately as the crafters do;
thus they may not be able to capitalize on the nuances and internal messaging.
Build your strategic communications plan around the central idea. Have a clear core
message. Your rollout plan must engage across multiple media venues. Have a scalable message suitable for any size venue. Understand that every action is a message—a
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strategic communication. Synchronize the message inside and coming from OPNAV
and echelon components.

Observation 30

Image source: DoD Imagery Library.

Whether or not one agreed with President Ronald W. Reagan’s policies or decisions, no
one can deny that he was a great communicator who made his goals for his presidency
simple and clear. He incorporated this core message into almost all his speeches, relating specific decisions to his general goal. Through this approach, the core message became a guiding philosophy, generating corresponding lines of effort for problem solving.
The single-core-message approach makes for a tight, internally consistent strategy
and a subsequent network of supporting plans. Notice, too, that President Reagan’s
message confined itself to three points.
This approach deserves emulation in any crafting of strategy. Unfortunately, the recent
Navy attempts at strategy have not emulated this approach, particularly in 2019.
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With so many different lists of priorities, themes, core messages, and lines of effort
(LOEs) in 2019, it was difficult for the Navy to communicate its strategic policy goals
with a single voice, so it could stay on message and be understood. There never was
a real agreement on the Navy’s mission and desired end state.
The mission:
•

From the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV): “The Department of the Navy
will recruit, train, equip, and organize to deliver combat-ready naval forces
to win conflicts and wars while maintaining security and deterrence through
sustained forward presence.”

•

From the CNO: “The United States Navy will be ready to conduct prompt and
sustained combat incident to operations at sea. Our Navy will protect America
from attack, promote American prosperity, and preserve America’s strategic influence.” (Note that this is just the first two sentences of the four-sentence
mission statement in the CNO’s Design 2.0 directive.)

The vision (or end state):
•

From the SECNAV: “A combat-credible Navy and Marine Corps Team focused on
rebuilding military readiness, strengthening alliances, and reforming business
practices in support of the National Defense Strategy.”
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•

From the CNO: “A Naval Force that produces leaders and teams, armed with the
best equipment, who learn and adapt faster than our rivals to achieve maximum
possible performance and is ready for decisive combat operations.”

Given that these lists, missions, and end states all reflect SECNAV and CNO direction,
not much could have been done to align and simplify the Navy’s overall strategic message. There simply was too much divergence in language.

Observation 31

N. C. Wyeth, The Storybook, 1921. Source: Betty Krulik Fine Art, NY. Used by permission.

Authors Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking write the following about the importance of narrative in today’s world.
Narratives are the building blocks that explain both how humans see the world and how they
exist in large groups. They provide the lens through which we perceive ourselves, others, and the
environment around us. They are the stories that bind the small to the large, connecting personal
experience to some bigger notion of how the world works. The stronger a narrative is, the more
likely it is to be retained and remembered.
The power of a narrative depends on a confluence of factors, but the most important is
consistency—the way that one event links logically to the next. . . . As narratives generate
attention and interest, they necessarily abandon some of their complexity. . . .
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By simplifying complex realities, good narratives can slot into other people’s preexisting comprehension. . . . The most effective narratives can thus be shared among entire communities, peoples,
or nations, because they tap into our most elemental notions. . . .
These three traits—simplicity, resonance, and novelty—determine which narratives stick and which
fall flat. It’s no coincidence that everyone from far-right political leaders to women’s rights activists
to the Kardashian clan speaks constantly of “controlling the narrative.” To control the narrative is to
dictate to an audience who the heroes and villains are; what is right and what is wrong; what’s real
and what’s not. As jihadist Omar Hammami, a leader of the Somali-based terror group Al-Shabaab,
put it, “The war of narratives has become even more important than the war of navies, napalm, and
knives.”
The big losers in this narrative battle are those people or institutions that are too big, too slow, or
too hesitant to weave such stories. These are not the kinds of battles that a plodding, uninventive
bureaucracy can win. As a U.S. Army officer lamented to us about what happens when the military
deploys to fight this generation’s web-enabled insurgents and terrorists, “Today we go in with the
assumption that we’ll lose the battle of the narrative.”35

Since we do not want to “lose the battle of the narrative,” it is imperative that we apply a
narrative approach to the crafting of naval strategy, as in the example below.

My own awareness of the power of the narrative approach started with an e-mail from
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., a retired U.S. Army colonel, author, and CEO of the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, in February 2016. Krepinevich suggested that
we not use the core attributes or characteristics of the Navy in isolation as the foundation of our message. Instead, he recommended that we attach a relevant, understandable
purpose to each attribute by answering the question “To do what?” He gave an example

62  leidos chair of future warfare studies

from a conversation he had with a congressman, who stated, “I kinda get a 30-slide, high
density, small font brief when it’s presented, but a week later, I can’t give you the logic
train behind the brief.”
So Krepinevich suggested using the text shown here. The kernel of his suggested narrative is crystal clear and easy to remember: “China is building a big navy that is changing
the strategic balance in the western Pacific.”36 In contrast, the bureaucratic staff approach simply does not grab the reader’s attention; it lacks specificity and real-world logic, and generally is too abstract—which is fairly representative of military staff writing.

Observation 32

Image source: John Dyer, “Why Do Silos Form and How Can We Knock Them Down?,” Industry Week, 10 June 2014. Used with
permission.

When working with OPNAV staff to produce capstone naval strategies, I shared the
same experiences as Professor Turner of the Army War College. Turner noted the
following:
In our case, the strategic document became a mirror image of the views of those whom we briefed.
For example, officers and civilians dealing with the budget always circled around to a discussion
of how the document could shape future outlays of money. This process repeated itself with each
organization and resulted in a large time and intellectual commitment expended on definition and
education rather than ideas and concepts. Added to this, each organization had its own view of what
had to be in the document and how it should be structured, which at times made it resemble a dish
prepared by too many cooks.37
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Observation 33

Obviously, the crafting of strategy takes time. What may not be obvious is that the
timing of issuing a strategy plays a major role in its overall effectiveness, let alone its
effective dissemination. Similar to policies issued in the final months of a lame-duck
presidency, those strategy documents issued shortly before a change of Navy or DoD
leadership rarely have significant impact or lasting effect.
Strategy documents ultimately reflect the desired policies of the chief strategist
(the CNO); thus their implementation is dependent on the tenure of the strategist,
or on the willingness of his successor to maintain the same strategy without significant
revision. In a competitive environment in which hyperbole-laced debates over resources
take place, the thirst for a “new” strategy with new, “innovative” terminology and
arguments is always present. Leaders feel pressure to sign off on their own strategy
documents. This creates a churn in which strategies appear credible only as long as the
chief strategist / leader remains in that position. Strategies issued early in the leader’s
tenure have a chance to gain effect, whereas those issued late in the tour indeed are
viewed as lame ducks.
In recent years, continuity has become very artificial. Instead of attempting to replace
an existing official strategy document, SECNAVs and CNOs have issued guidance
papers and directives that reinterpret or supersede some part of the existing strategy.

64  leidos chair of future warfare studies

Often this has been done for the sake of speed and to avoid a laborious crafting of strategy. Sometimes, however, it is done to avoid public debate about or external involvement
in any obvious shift in Navy strategy.
Meanwhile, new strategies from higher authorities may or may not be issued on any
firm schedule. Such schedules may exist, particularly as concerns joint documents, but
often they are overtaken by events. Congress has put in place (legal) time requirements
for the issuance of the president’s National Security Strategy, but recent administrations
have ignored these time requirements without consequence. Presumably, Navy strategies should incorporate all the guidance from the NSS, the SECDEF’s National Defense
Strategy, and the CJCS’s National Military Strategy, but rarely do they align in sequence
or terminology. Crafters of strategy must be wary of timing, but there are no hard-andfast answers except that any strategy issued late in a CNO’s term is unlikely to have any
significant effect.

Observation 34
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As a corollary to the last observation, releasing a Navy capstone strategy approximately
three months prior to a presidential election is not prudent, for obvious reasons. After
the presidential election, many consider it imprudent to release a strategy until the new
administration publishes its NSS, as well as its NDS (which is a more recently established
document). In the 2017–18 time frame, SECDEF Mattis made it abundantly clear to
CNO Richardson (2015–19) that there would be “no daylight” between the NDS and the
classified 2018 Navy Strategy. Indeed, the full and formal subtitle of the Navy Strategy
published in November 2018 is “The Navy’s Contribution to the Joint Force,” whereas at
one time the subtitle read “The Naval Component of the National Defense Strategy.”
However, with a plethora of higher guidance generally arriving at times not in keeping
with anticipated schedules, there may be no optimum time to issue a new, overarching
Navy Strategy. Therefore, the Navy uses work-arounds. For reasons of continuity between CNOs, CNO Adm. Michael M. Gilday (2019–) elected to retain CNO Adm. John
M. Richardson’s Design 2.0. However, Gilday’s 2019 FRAGO (fragmentary order) is a
governing directive that implicitly takes precedence over Design 2.0. As previously noted, Design 2.0 had taken precedence by effectively rescinding what at the time remained
the official tri–Sea Service strategy, CS21R.

Observation 35

Most defense debates are not about strategy, but instead about the adoption of new
capabilities—of which emerging technologies have become a driving factor. This has
given many of the debaters the impression that the emergence of new technologies
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automatically overturns existing strategies and that technological development and
acquisition is an effective strategy in itself. This impression violates the very definition
and theory of strategy, because the conflation of technology and capabilities with strategy
ensures that the ends are defined by the means. As the old saying goes, “To a hammer,
everything looks like a nail.” Driving a nail into the wrong place at the wrong time simply because the hammer exists—even if it is the most technologically advanced hammer
ever conceived—is not good strategy. In fact, it is not strategy at all.

Observation 36

The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the president, SECDEF, and NSC. All Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) members have a responsibility to provide advice or opinions, when
requested or on their own initiative, via the CJCS, to the president, SECDEF, and NSC.
Therefore, in addition to the CNO’s Title 10 responsibility to develop the Navy, he has a
responsibility to describe to the JCS how the Navy will be employed. This requires two
distinct strategies, one to develop the force and the other to employ the force. The two
strategies require different components.

crafting naval strategy   67

Images source: DoD Imagery Library.

The graphic above conveys an important point illustrated by the famous 1980s Maritime
Strategy and the equally famous objective to reach a six-hundred-ship Navy. The former
was a Navy force-employment strategy with a central idea of offensively attacking the
Soviets’ Barents Sea bastions to deprive them of a maritime sanctuary, while the latter
was a Navy force-development strategy to build a Navy that could deter and, if necessary, defeat the Soviets. Depending on the strategy, the forces and capabilities are either
the means or the ends.
Note that, in this post-Goldwater-Nichols era, the force-employment component is not
a strategy to fight. LOEs, phasing, and other tools for fighting are not best addressed
in a service capstone strategy. Today and into the future, the Navy mans, organizes,
trains, and equips its future force for the fight, but does not fight by itself. Therefore the
force-employment-strategy component is more an expression of how the Navy will fight
and how a conflict may unfold. This allows the OPNAV staff to pursue solutions for
maintaining the current force and building the future force.
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Observation 37

Graphic source: Justturnright, “Economics for Dummies . . . and Liberals,” Two Heads Are Better than One (blog), 29 December 2012,
thabto.wordpress.com/. Used by permission.

Your strategy must be capable of informing resource allocation for force development.
Navy budget programmers considered the 2007 Cooperative Strategy to be “not useful”
for articulating requirements and defending budgets; the 2015 version of this
strategy (CS21R) likewise was not considered particularly useful. Indeed, CNO
Jonathan Greenert (2011–15) did not construct three of his annual posture statements
for Congress around this strategy.
While there is no hard-and-fast rule for how to design a strategy document so that it informs resource allocation, starting the crafting of a strategy without a firm recognition
that part of its purpose is to give guidance to budget programmers is a mistake.
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Observation 38

Graphic source: DreamsTime Free Images. Used by permission.

Drafting a strategy is only a first step, albeit a difficult one. The crafter needs to develop
the strategy with implementation in mind. Here is how to institutionalize strategy.
•

Begin by inserting high-level implementation taskers into the body of a Navy strategy to signal that the strategy is real, relevant, and significant—not to be ignored.

•

Produce an implementation plan that specifies the processes, activities, and objectives required to achieve the ends of a Navy strategy.

•

Translate the ends of a Navy strategy into measurable implementation objectives
linked to DCNO and subordinate organizational goals.

•

Assign owners to each objective and initiative, for clear responsibilities and
accountability.

•

Conduct periodic progress reviews of implementation to monitor execution.

•

Oversee execution by active senior leadership and drive implementation across the
Navy by dedicated operational planning teams.

•

Communicate strategy repeatedly to explain its logic and achieve buy-in.
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Leaders habitually underestimate the challenge of implementing strategy. Follow-up
procedures are needed to ascertain whether implementation is being carried out effectively. The follow-up should include the actions listed below:
•

Conducting periodic progress reviews of implementation to determine whether the
strategy is relevant to the Navy’s purpose. Since the Navy operates in a very dynamic
environment, the reviews are essential to know whether the strategy is meeting the
Navy’s needs.

•

Assigning objectives and initiatives to individual “owners.” Accountability drives
implementation. The implementation plan requires that clear and specific tasks be
defined to implement the strategy. Everyone with implementation responsibilities
needs to know what to do and what to achieve.

•

Selecting the correct strategic metrics to track progress on the objectives or
initiatives identified in the implementation plan. Measurable objectives provide
an effective basis for management control of the implementation.

•

Ensuring that senior leaders actively manage the execution of the strategy and guide
implementation across the Navy. The focus should be on ensuring that the strategy
is understood throughout the Navy.

The quote by retired Army colonel Ralph Peters is an appropriate description of
strategies that are executed poorly.38 No matter how simple, logical, and eloquent, they
amount to little if they do not have a positive result; hence the need for crafters of strategy to be concerned with—and involved in guiding—their execution.
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Observation 39

In a world in which new ideas are championed whereas older ideas are viewed as wornout “legacy,” leaders are inclined to try to put distance between their statements and
policies and those of their predecessors, even when the policies are essentially the same
(because they are working). This is true of leadership in DoD, in which competitive
careers are rewarded with advancement for establishing new programs or new methods
of operation (sometimes more efficient, sometimes not), not for simply carrying out
established practices well. The buzzword transformation once dominated DoD, and it
still does to a certain extent. Often it is assumed that to be transformational one needs
to generate new terminology for emerging (or even continuing) concepts, and existing
strategies need to be rewritten, even if the changes are slight in reality.
This tendency may provide routine employment for the crafters of strategy, but often it
generates confusion among members of the audience of those who carry it out. By its nature, strategy—unlike immediate plans—is inherently a long-term approach to problem
solving amid opposition. The need for long-term implementation requires a degree of
continuity in terms as well as in direction. The need to be a champion of “new” concepts,
reform, or transformation chafes against the requirement for a degree of continuity.

72  leidos chair of future warfare studies

The crafters of strategy must seek a balance between incorporating new terminology and
maintaining an appearance of continuity. Every new term incorporated must be defined—
clearly, and often repeatedly—for the audience. Doing this in any one document requires
great eloquence—as stated before, a glossary may be the key to that—but the repeated
defining of new terms often must be performed throughout the dissemination phase.
The example shows two different Navy mission statements from two different, albeit
sequential, CNOs. Although it is a CNO’s perquisite to define the mission of the organization, changes always entail cost—in the resultant need for redefinition and dissemination, if nowhere else. Crafters of strategy need to make the CNO aware of these
costs, particularly when new terms are introduced that essentially are a repackaging of
concepts already understood.
When terms newly introduced by previous leadership—such as joint operational access
in the above—are dropped, those implementing strategy may interpret that as a significant change, even if it actually is less an operational change than a preference for a
new expression. Crafters of strategy must be attuned to these interpretations and help
mitigate them when appropriate. If a significant change is not an imperative, continuity
pays dividends.

Observation 40

Notes: Dan Gouré, “Will Commandant Berger’s New Marine Corps Be a High-Tech Forlorn Hope?,” Real Clear Defense, 1 April 2020,
www.realcleardefense.com/; T. X. Hammes, “Building a Marine Corps for Every Contingency, Clime, and Place,” War on the Rocks,
15 April 2020, warontherocks.com/.
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“Seeking ground truth” is an admonition for thorough research among the contending
ideas that constitute the defense debate. There always are contending views, and while
some strategies (particularly hedging strategies) reconcile them effectively, most will be
crafted around a particular argument (ultimately that of the SECNAV, the CNO, or the
Marine Corps commandant, or some combination thereof). However, the crafters must
research and be familiar with all the arguments concerning the concepts incorporated
into the strategy.
In the example above, Force Design 2030 proposes a transformation of the Corps’s force
structure and the need for the Marines to act as a “stand-in force” inside an adversary’s
weapons-employment zone to provide a more potent deterrent. Is it the correct recipe
for the future? To serve the commandant well, his crafters of strategy need to perform
the due diligence of tracing out contending arguments and determining both what
should shape the strategy and what intellectual opposition the strategy will encounter.
In a democracy, defense strategy is subject to debate; it is part of the political dialogue
of the nation. Crafters of strategy must be aware that what they write will become a part
of this dialogue. This is not so they can attempt to avoid it, but so they can advise their
principal of what he should expect in the debate. If the strategy cannot be defended effectively by logic and explanation in the public arena, it will not be an effective strategy.

Observation 41

Notes: Lindsey Ford, “The ‘Lippmann Gap’ in Asia: Four Challenges to a Credible U.S. Strategy,” War on the Rocks, 3 December
2018, warontherocks.com/; Stephanie Pezard and Ashley L. Rhoades, What Provokes Putin’s Russia? Deterring without Unintended Escalation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), p. 13, available at www.rand.org/; Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,”
International Affairs 87, no. 6 (November 2011), pp. 1284–96, available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.
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For military and naval assessments, the term risk is used in the following different ways:
•

as a synonym for a threat itself;

•

as a description that identifies chance of harm or injury from a threat;

•

as an expression of the mathematical result of frequency of occurrence multiplied by
consequence; and

•

as an expression of whether forces can accomplish assigned missions—in other
words, risk as a result of operations.

All these forms generate the famous “friction” of the unpredicted. In crafting strategy,
there never will be sufficient resources or predictability to eliminate risk completely, so
one must analyze the strategic environment properly and make informed decisions that
both mitigate and accept appropriate degrees of risk. Unfortunately, there is no ready
formula.
Risks must be listed in a context of realism, along with the means to address them. Risk
to the Navy can be categorized within four dimensions: operational, force management,
institutional, and future challenges.
•

Operational risk deals with the short-term challenges facing the Navy, as well as our
ability to succeed in the current fight, including preparedness for contingencies in
the near term.

•

Force-management risk deals with ensuring that the Navy is efficiently and effectively organized, manned, equipped, trained, and sustained to provide trained and
ready forces to the force commanders.

•

Institutional risk addresses the generating force’s ability to support the Navy’s operating force.

•

Future-challenges risk deals with the Navy’s ability to address longer-term threats.

The Navy mitigates exposure to risk by ensuring that the right capabilities and sufficient capacity are balanced and available within acceptable bounds of risk to respond
effectively and efficiently to challenges.
Col. Mackubin T. Owens, USMC (Ret.), notes the following:
A good strategy also seeks to minimize risk by, to the extent possible, avoiding mismatches between
strategy and related factors. For instance, strategy must be appropriate to the ends as established by
policy. Strategy also requires the appropriate tactical instrument to implement it. Finally, the forces
required to implement a strategy must be funded, or else it must be revised. If the risk generated by
such policy/strategy, strategy/force, and force/budget mismatches cannot be managed, the variables
must be brought into better alignment.39
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Observation 42

Graphic source: Lanworks Public Domain.

How can one grade a strategy document on its probable effectiveness? As with everything involved in the crafting of strategy, there are no hard-and-fast answers. However,
one can evaluate the product in terms of (1) acceptability, (2) feasibility, (3) suitability to
the circumstances, (4) sustainability, and (5) adaptability.
•

Acceptability to the leadership is obvious; if—in terms of naval strategy—the product
is not acceptable to the CNO, it is going nowhere.

•

Feasibility requires an assessment of whether the Navy has or (probably) will have
the resources to carry out the strategy. A strategy can be aspirational in the sense
that it can be used as an argument for more resources; however, it must be adaptable
enough to be implemented with a reasonable probability of success—not with no or
even low risk, but with justifiable risk.

•

Suitability to circumstances refers to the product’s conformity to national objectives.
A strategy that postulates a threat that the political leadership does not recognize
will be controversial, to say the least.

•

Sustainability refers to more than supporting resources; it also encompasses whether
personnel can carry out the product’s implications over the long term. A strategy
that postulates substitution of autonomous systems for human control cannot be
carried out if there is insufficient funding for such systems at the same time that
manpower is being cut. The U.S. Navy has had previous experience with not having
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enough personnel to operate complex systems that optimistically were assumed to
be “lower maintenance.” Without an honest and rigorous examination, it is possible
to assume that a strategy will be easier to implement than reality dictates.
•

The apocryphal quote by Field Marshal von Moltke cited in the introduction—that
“no plan survives contact with the enemy”—can be translated as saying that no
strategy can survive a changing security environment if adaptability is not built into
its design.

Observation 43

Image source: author.

With one exception, observation 43 is a collecting together of points made previously,
restated as a guideline on what easily contributes to failure in the crafting of strategy.
Number 43 is, in fact, the most significant observation of all in distinguishing successful efforts from failed attempts. In my experience, these are not mere suggestions;
rather, failure to recognize any one of the above truths will damage fatally any effort to
develop a strategy. Of course, recognition of the reality of these dangers is not enough;
the crafters of strategy always must have a plan to mitigate the dangers or otherwise use
and benefit from that reality.
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The one point not previously discussed is the separation of the crafters’ egos from the
product crafted. It is easy for writers to fall in love with their own words, for those with
insight to become enamored of their own ideas, and for intermediate reviewers to be
committed to their edits. Yet the final document—which will reflect the decisions of
the issuing authority (the CNO)—may appear vastly different from previous versions.
In such a process, pride of authorship becomes a burden, particularly when submitted
drafts are returned repeatedly for additional editing. Crafting strategy is not about the
strategists or their intervening chain of command; it is about the product.
This truly is hard stuff.

Observation 44
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Former SECDEF Mattis is not one to avoid controversy. He also is admired widely as
a deep thinker who has examined war strategically, operationally, and tactically. Operations he commanded as a general in the U.S. Marine Corps always met their objectives. This he consistently attributes to his reading of history. Through doing so he has
learned of others’ mistakes and has pondered how to avoid them. History always entails
an examination of past strategies; it also is the basis for the future events that will result.
Actions that happen in the future will become history as they unfold.
The problem with the vast majority of books on management is that, in describing the
management theories that their authors endorse, they pay insufficient attention to longterm history. They usually focus on recent business successes—often featuring businesses that eventually fail; Enron, Kmart, and Lehman Brothers are but three examples.
The books do this instead of examining strategies that succeed over the long term, since
doing the latter is not perceived as novel, dramatic, or transformational enough. Many
such books at the time of publication espouse management theories that have not been
applied yet and whose predicted results cannot be verified. Some exhort rapid adaptability toward changing opportunities—businesses jamming like jazz musicians—rather
than adopting firm strategies, with their inconvenient “traditional restraints.” However,
taking such risks with financial capital does not compare to taking risks with the lives
of servicemembers or the security of the nation.
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In my view, it is imperative for crafters of strategy to make themselves knowledgeable
through the continuous reading of history, particularly military history, as well as of the
development of strategy itself. Toward that end, we conclude this volume with an annotated bibliography of sources most useful to those who accept the challenge of crafting
naval strategy.
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Betts, Richard K. “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000),
pp. 5–50. Available at www.columbia.edu/.
Betts develops “ten critiques that throw the practicability of strategy into
question,” among them the difficulty of foresight (there can be no evaluation
in advance differentiating “good” from “bad” strategy), the inapplicability
of hindsight (since exact situations do not repeat), psychological barriers,
difficult organizational processes, and political considerations. His concern is
that many “academics do not take seriously the barriers to effective strategy”
and do not “learn enough about the processes of decision-making or military
operations to grasp how hard it is to implement strategic plans.” He quotes
Bernard Brodie that “the question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea
work? . . . In that respect it is like other branches of politics and like any of the
applied sciences, and not at all like pure science, where the function of theory
is to describe, organize, and explain and not to prescribe.”
Betts sees strategy as tying the act of war to political ends. “Strategy is the essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable.
It is the link between military means and political ends, the scheme for how to
make one produce the other. . . . Because strategy is necessary, however, does
not mean that it is possible.” He states that “to skeptics, effective strategy is
often an illusion because what happens in the gap between policy objectives
and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be manipulated to a
specified end. When this is true, war cannot be a legitimate instrument of
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policy.” Betts identifies himself as a skeptic, but not necessarily to the extent of
believing that war cannot be a legitimate instrument of policy. Betts points to
correct strategies adopted for the wrong reasons, an example of which he pins
on Winston Churchill for deciding that Britain, after the fall of continental
Europe to Germany and while Germany and the Soviet Union maintained a
treaty, would fight on alone despite no guarantee of American involvement—a
strategy that was chosen for reasons “other than strategic logic” (certainly a
controversial argument, which he lightens by stating, “Thank God for bad
strategy”).
Betts argues effectively on both sides of his ten critiques—one of which is
that it is more difficult for democracies—characterized by the ever-present
possibility of political change, and in which any strategy becomes a domestic
political issue—to develop and maintain consistent, long-term strategies (an
assertion that the Cold War seems to have refuted). Another critique is the
observation that “there is little demonstrable relationship between strategies
and outcomes in war,” and thus strategies can be “good” only in the sense that
desirable results are obtained, even when it is by happenstance.
Here Betts touches on the fact that a plethora of means can overcome
even the most carefully wrought opposing strategies—a variation of the
nineteenth-century misquote that “God is usually on the side of the bigger
battalions (or those who shoot best).” Betts’s article is not directly concerned
with the practice of crafting strategy, but it is his conclusions—that the means
dominate the ends-ways-means connection, and that strategy is more about
the tailoring of the objective to the means than about developing the means
to achieve the objectives—that are of concern to crafters. “Strategy fails when
the chosen means prove insufficient to the ends. This can happen because the
wrong means are chosen or because the ends are too ambitious or slippery.
Strategy can be salvaged more often if peacetime planning gives as much consideration to limiting the range of ends as to expanding the menu of means.”
Betts is professor of war and peace studies and Director, International Security
Policy Program at Columbia University.
Biddle, Tami D. Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to
Know. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015. Available at
publications.armywarcollege.edu/.
Biddle states that her purpose is “to give the student of strategy an anchor
point—a foothold that can be used as a foundation for further analysis and
primer for work in the practical realm.” Admitting that there is a myriad of
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definitions for strategy and that practitioners and scholars need to pick and
define their own clearly prior to introducing their work, she maintains “that
strategy demands a theory—a proposed causal explanation—that must stand
up to rigorous analysis. A theory, in its most basic form, can be expressed as:
‘if x, then y.’ Thus, the strategist must be able to defend the statement, ‘If we
use resource X, then we will achieve objective Y’ (‘or at least move in the direction of achieving objective Y’).” Yet “the word ‘then’ carries a heavy burden
since it must be able to do a lot of work and bear intense evaluation—and this
scrutiny must include, above all, the close examination of one’s assumptions
since these serve as the building blocks of the causal relationship linking ends
and means. Strategy rests on assumptions; if assumptions go unexamined,
then one risks building a strategic edifice on a foundation of sand.” Her concern is that
such scrutiny does not take place, either because no one takes the time for it or
because it would question or challenge organizational culture or individual preferences.
Too often, the explanatory logic of strategy ends up being little more than an organizational mantra, or a facile assertion about the overwhelming power of a particular
military instrument, or the easy opportunity presented by an enemy’s presumed
frailties. When faced with an unanticipated crisis, political decisionmakers may grab
for the first option that looks even vaguely plausible in order to keep domestic critics at
bay—especially those who would charge them with being unresponsive and/or weak.

The author divides strategy between grand strategy (which other countries
often refer to as national strategy, or more rarely higher strategy) and theater
strategy, which is most exclusively the province of the military commander.
This division is followed by a discussion of the hierarchy, with operations and
tactics below, and of the “instruments of power—including military, diplomatic, and economic instruments.” She quotes the scholar John Lewis Gaddis—
known for his studies of the Cold War—that grand strategy is “the calculated
relationship of means to large ends. It’s about how one uses whatever one has
to get to wherever it is one wants to go.”
Considerable effort is made to distinguish (theater) strategy from tactics.
The monograph notes that “[t]heater strategy and grand strategy form the
backbone of the curriculum at senior staff colleges inside the U.S. military’s
professional military education system, where practitioners study the many elements shaping the highest level of their art. Faculty members at these colleges
understand and use the word ‘strategy’ in roughly similar ways. They perceive
its central idea as the intelligent identification, utilization, and coordination
of resources (ways and means) for the successful attainment of a specific

84  leidos chair of future warfare studies

objective (end).” However, Biddle admits that the simplicity of this ends-waysmeans formulation is deceptive, since
[b]arriers to creating a straightforward linkage between ends, ways, and means
are not only very real, but also multifaceted and persistent. This fact poses challenges for the way that strategy and grand strategy are taught in an academic setting. A framework that uses “ends, ways, and means” is not a bad way to enter
into a discussion of strategy since it gives students a chance to gain initial traction as they begin their analysis. However, it is not enough . . . [and] the teaching of strategy in the professional military education system has been criticized
on the ground that it fails to capture the complexities . . . in the real world.

Unfortunately, the monograph does not quite articulate a solution to this challenge beyond quoting a RAND study that “[c]ivilian policymakers require an
active dialogue with the military and other sources of information to inform
the diagnosis of the situation, as well as to develop realistic policy objectives”
and advising—owing to concern for proper civil-military relations—that “officers must acquire political acumen without political assertiveness. They must
understand the political environment they work in well enough to be effective
while resisting any temptation toward political meddling.” The author does
not clarify whether resisting “political meddling” includes passionately speaking truth to power when the grand strategy cannot be achieved given existing
resources, or can be achieved only at high risk. Recommended tools to provide
civilian-military collaboration in crafting strategy include the examination of
historical case studies, red teaming, and tabletop exercises. Yet, given political
considerations (both international and domestic), “military planners must
abandon the belief that they will always be able to build a strategy that is designed or tailored to meet a well-articulated political objective. . . . [It is better
to] recognize the realities than to base their expectations on an idealized form
of the process that exists only in the antiseptic environment of the classroom,”
although they still should “seek clarity and specific goals.” Given the allvolunteer nature of American military service, Biddle expresses concern that
civilian political leaders do not have enough knowledge of military matters to
recognize the “bluntness of the military instrument,” its limitation by logistics,
and that a successful military operation cannot guarantee “winning the peace”
(a phrase from Sir Basil Liddell Hart).
Examining whether there are “options”—alternatives to the difficult struggle
of crafting strategy—“that may be valid for some actors under certain circumstances,” Biddle cites Australian scholar Peter Layton as identifying opportunism (“an option for actors who may not have the resources to shape outcomes,
but instead may wish to grasp and exploit the breaks that come their way”) and
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risk management. However, the monograph’s distinction between strategy
and risk management remains unconvincing.
The author’s best depiction of effective strategies consists of those that can
bring “triumphs out of setbacks.” Advising that the crafting of strategy
requires a detailed knowledge of history, honest interaction with civilian
officials, patience, empathy, good judgment, challenging of assumptions, and
moral courage, Biddle’s paramount observation is that the most important
quality of the strategist is the ability to “ask the right questions at the right time.”
Biddle is professor of history and national security at the U.S. Army War
College.
Cutler, Thomas J., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Strategy. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2015.
This “wheel book” anthologizes a selection of articles and book chapters from
U.S. Naval Institute publications that the editor considers to be the most significant or lasting, starting with the works of Sir Julian Corbett (early 1900s)
but emphasizing more-recent writings. In this, Cutler combines selections of
“successful” or impactful concepts with recommendations on how to craft
strategy. In the latter category are notable contributions by Peter Swartz and
John Byron, Frank Hoffman, and James Stavridis. Also included are the
concepts of such naval-strategy stalwarts as Samuel Huntington, Stansfield
Turner, J. C. Wylie, and Norman Friedman.
Beyond the direct recommendations represented by the Swartz and Byron,
Hoffman, and Stavridis inclusions, this volume can provide a “sense of inspiration” to the crafters of strategy, in that ideas (strategic visions) matter, and
particularly innovative ones tend to linger.
Cutler is a retired USN officer, naval historian, author, former U.S. Naval
Academy professor and Naval War College fleet professor, and currently Gordon
England Chair of Professional Naval Literature at the U.S. Naval Institute.
Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013.
The Economist calls this book “magisterial,” a very apt description.
Freedman addresses the use of strategy from depictions in the Bible
through nuclear strategy to the revolution in military affairs, dividing
the concept into strategies of force (classical military usage), strategy from
below (the long-term strategies to power of political movements such as
Marxism), and strategies from above (management strategies of business elites).
Along the way, he tackles (from a scholarly viewpoint) such unique niches as
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“the strategy of Satan,” then concludes with a discussion of the limits to rationalchoice theory as the controlling element of strategy. At 751 pages, the sheer
size of the book may seem intimidating; however, although it takes an academic approach, it is written for a more general reader and with an underlying
sense of good humor (who else would quote boxer Mike Tyson on planning?).
As noted in this Black Book, Freedman insists that the difference between
strategies and plans lies in the fact that a strategy needs to address active
opposition to its objectives—hence its military roots.
Freedman’s influence stems from his previous writings on nuclear strategy;
the academic positions he has held; and the official United Kingdom (U.K.)
military histories he has supervised, such as that on the Falkland Islands
War. Freedman is Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London.
Gray, Colin S. “Why Strategy Is Difficult.” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 22 (Summer 1999),
pp. 6–12. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/.
Professor Colin Gray published extensively—possibly more than any other
individual—on a variety of strategies and concepts, particularly in the nuclear
and maritime realms. This article is a short summary of ideas discussed in his
book The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2010), which revolve around the argument that “strategy is neither policy nor
armed combat; rather it is the bridge between them.”
Gray observes that “true strategy must be practical,” giving two examples
where strategists applied “incorrectly framed questions because guesses about
the future were not correct”: Nazi Germany’s Operation Barbarossa invasion
of Soviet Russia and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
Strategists need to recall Clausewitz’s dictum that there is a “‘culminating
point of victory,’ beyond which lies a decline in relative strength” and determine where this culminating point is located. The key is to design the strategy
with the actions of the opponent included as a major consideration.
Additionally, “three reasons why it is difficult to do strategy well” are “its very
nature, which endures through time and in all contexts”; “the multiplicity and
sheer variety of sources of friction”; and the fact that “it is planned for contexts
that literally have not occurred and might not occur.”
Gray’s fear for U.S. strategies is the American tendency to seek “mechanical
panaceas” to victory and to include such in our strategic designs. This tendency he associates with Adm. William A. Owens, USN, former Vice Chairman
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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1994–96), and his concept of a “system of systems”
that could dissipate the “fog of war.”
The value of this article for the crafting of strategy is in two warnings: (1) basing any strategic design on mechanical panaceas invites failure in application,
and (2) strategy must account for opposition—not just from potential military
opponents but from critics, the media, armed services competing for resources, and alternative concepts.
The author of over twenty-five books on national-security issues, Gray (a dual
U.S. and U.K. citizen) taught at numerous universities and was a fellow at several think tanks before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax,
Virginia. He served on the Reagan administration’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. He died in 2020.
Heffington, Steven, Adam Oler, and David Tretler, eds. A National Security Strategy
Primer. Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2019. Available at
nwc.ndu.edu/.
This primer is designed to provide “National War College (NWC)
students with a common point of departure for consideration of national
security strategy” by drawing “substantially from current joint and Servicespecific doctrine as well as extant Department of Defense procedures and
policy guidance.” Although it is recommended as a tool for interagency
efforts at crafting strategy, the editors note that the document “is neither
official policy nor doctrine. It is the product of a collaborative effort by
members of the NWC faculty, staff, and student body.”
While admitting that the “strategist always operates in an atmosphere of widespread uncertainty and ambiguity,” the primer
uses the ends-ways-means method of assessing strategy, identifying
the following “five . . . fundamental elements of strategic logic”:
1. “[A]nalyzing the strategic situation (the challenge and its context)”
2. Identifying desired ends—“the overarching political aim” and
“specific objectives required to achieve it”
3. “[I]dentifying and/or developing the means (resource and capabilities)”
4. “[D]esigning the ways to use the means to achieve the desired ends”
5. “[A]ssessing the costs/risks associated with the strategy”
Stating approvingly that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 rationalized the
crafting of U.S. strategy by requiring an annual National Security Strategy

88  leidos chair of future warfare studies

(NSS) as a capstone document from which all defense strategies flow, one
of the editors maintains that “[t]he hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates
span of control. It represents a logical means of delegating responsibility and
authority among senior leadership. It also suggests that if strategy consists of
objectives, concepts, and resources each should be appropriate to the level of
strategy and consistent with one another.” Not mentioned, however, are the
facts that NSSs also are written with domestic politics in mind and that administrations have issued them infrequently rather than annually. The primer
associates the “success” of the NSS with the continuity of overarching U.S.
strategy during the Cold War (which Goldwater-Nichols largely postdates) and
with President Clinton’s “engagement and enlargement” strategy (which some
now criticize as leading to renewed hostility with Russia).
In any event, the primer emphasizes a rigid hierarchy to be applied to the
crafting of strategy. A problem with the hierarchic approach that the book
understresses, however, is that a misapprehension in the capstone document
can lead to a cascade of such in the subordinate documents. In describing the
method of “analyzing the strategic situation,” the primer stresses the need for
identifying the underlying assumptions of any strategy. It urges the drafting of
a definitive problem statement in the following format: “
situation threatens or presents an opportunity for 		
interests
because 		
.” In drafting such a problem statement, the primer
advises that “[w]hile the problem statement should be as fact-based as possible,
because it is based at least partially on assumption, it is fundamentally the
strategist’s contextual hypothesis. Even relatively minor differences in this hypothesis can drive substantial differences in the resultant strategy.” Obviously,
this is a significant reason to identify the opening assumptions. This section
includes a discussion of the differences among interests, threats, and opportunities, as well as effects of cognitive bias.
The primer’s following section on “defining the desired ends” is so short as to
be inconsequential, perhaps under the assumption that such objectives would
be defined well in the NSS. It very briefly recommends that an objective should
be stated “briefly” (presumably making it clear), since “verbose objectives
open the door to misperceptions and diversions.” The primer’s segment on
“identifying and/or developing the means” is the longest chapter, plodding
its way through course-text descriptions of the elements of power, institutions and actors, and instruments of power. Elements of power are defined by
what frequently are called national characteristics, such as natural resources,
geography, human capital, and national will. (Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings
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stress such characteristics.) In contrast, instruments of power are actions, such
as the use of diplomacy, threats of the use of force, and economic assistance.
The chapter on “designing the ways” specifies nine “fundamental strategic
approaches” (observe, accommodate, shape, persuade, enable, induce, coerce,
subdue, eradicate), which it juxtaposes with alternative “modes of action,” such
as overt versus covert and direct versus indirect. The chapter on assessing risks
is largely exhortation rather than practical recommendations, although “red
teaming” is considered “essential” and strategists are advised to ignore sunk
costs in evaluating whether a strategy with disappointing results should be
continued. The primer’s appendix A provides the steps and concerns provided
throughout in the form of a useful checklist.
The primer’s importance is that it accurately reflects—or perhaps frames—the
manner of crafting strategy as currently practiced in the Joint Staff, much of
which is formularized.
At the time of writing, the authors served as professors at the U.S. National War
College.
Heuser, Beatrice. The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010.
Heuser confines her book to strategies of war, approaching the subject through
the writings of influential strategists throughout history—reflecting what she
calls “the evolution of the literature on strategy.” Tracing this literature from
antiquity to the “return of small wars” in the first decade of the twenty-first
century, she focuses on the concepts that emerge to influence leaders, such as
mobilization, conscription, just war, total war, cult of the offensive, and limited
wars. Amid this voyage, she introduces the reader to little-known (or, for most
readers, unknown) writers on strategy, such as Christine de Pisan (of late
Middle Ages France), perhaps the first woman to write extensively on the art
of war. These are the people who “crafted strategy,” as opposed to those who
applied it.
Heuser identifies strategies of “war taken to its absurd extreme,” such as strategic nuclear war fighting or the belief that high technology can hold wars to
zero casualties. Like Freedman, she is concerned about the “frailty of human
logic,” a reality that few strategies acknowledge or can overcome.
Heuser’s influence stems from her previous work in editing (and sometimes
translating) the writings of little-known crafters of strategy for the modern
reader and on nuclear issues in NATO and European nations, and from her
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teaching appointments. She holds the chair of international history at the School
of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading (U.K.).
Hoffman, Frank G. “The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy: A Theory of
Success.” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 97 (2nd Quarter 2020), pp. 55–64. Available at
ndupress.ndu.edu/.
Hoffman admits that as “a common shorthand” the ends-ways-means construct does capture “the basic building blocks and underscores the necessity
of tying together the main components of a strategy in a holistic or coherent
manner.” Therefore, “[m]ost [professional military education] schools teach a
general and linear process model.” However, “[i]t is simplistic and formulaic,
if one reduces it to an equation or mindlessly uses it as a recipe.”
To overcome this, Hoffman recommends that the crafter of strategy approach
the work as “an untested hypothesis that promises to attain policy ends.” The
untested hypothesis also can be understood as a “theory of victory” or “theory
of success.” He quotes Jeffrey Meiser, a professor at the University of Portland
(Oregon) as follows: “[D]efining strategy as a theory of success encourages
creative thinking while keeping the strategist rooted in the process of causal
analysis; it brings assumptions to light and forces strategists to clarify exactly
how they plan to cause the desired end state to occur.” He also quotes Colin
Gray that “[t]he military planner is, ipso facto, a theorist. A plan is a theory
specifying how a particular goal might be secured[—]a theory of success.”
Hoffman briefly discusses several cases of applying theories of success.
In the case of Afghanistan, he questions whether the theory of victory was
too narrow and whether changes in conditions required and should have led
to a dramatic change in strategy. In the case of the second war in Iraq, the
theory was too broad for the resources allocated.
Hoffman maintains that a theory of success consists of much more
than answering the now famous question, “Tell me how this ends?”
He also adapts the National Defense University’s list of “causal mechanisms”
(as outlined in Heffington et al. in the entry above) as mechanisms to
convert a general guiding (or “big”) idea “into objectives and actionable
tasks.” He then broadens and expands the five assessment criteria for
analyzing strategy provided by Heffington in the form of a table.
The bottom line of the article is that a concept of a theory of success should
be the central idea of any strategy.
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Hoffman is Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, and a prolific writer on strategy and
defense issues, with experience in the crafting of strategy within the U.S. Marine
Corps and the Department of Defense overall.
Huntington, Samuel P. “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 80/5/615 (May 1954), pp. 483–93. Available at www.usni.org/.
Published at a time when the purpose of naval forces was being called into
question owing to the focus of political decision makers on nuclear weapons
delivered by land-based aviation, Huntington’s article points to the development of an enduring “strategic concept” as a method by which the Department
of the Navy could (re)define itself. Huntington describes a strategic concept as
“basically . . . a description of how, when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to its security.” The alternative
is that “if a service does not possess such a concept, it becomes purposeless, it
wallows amid a variety of conflicting and confusing goals, and it suffers both
physical and moral degeneration.”
This suggests a sociological role for the crafting of a service strategy that
goes beyond a rigid ends-ways-means approach or hierarchic adherence to a
top-down statement of the problem. To Huntington, the problem of crafting
strategy is also a search for the enduring—a strategic vision that is adaptable
to the “changing character of war” to which others allude. This is necessary
not only for directing practical actions but because “the resources which a
service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public
support of that service. . . . [Thus] the service has the responsibility to develop
this necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept
which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security.” A goal of
such a strategic concept is to help generate the “means” to be applied—which is
appropriate for the services’ Title 10 responsibilities, though not in sync with
the planning methodologies of today’s combatant commands, which rely on
the means the services provide.
The majority of Huntington’s article is taken up with an assessment of the
situation the U.S. Navy faced in the mid-1950s and his urging of it to conceive
of itself as “transoceanic” (i.e., focusing on achieving effects on land via its
effects on and from the sea—a more direct role in relation to U.S. political
objectives than others might perceive). The value of the article is captured
in Huntington’s summary of the interlaced need for a strategic concept: “In
summary, then, a military service may be viewed as consisting of a strategic
concept which defines the role of the service in national policy, public support
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which furnishes it with the resources to perform this role, and organizational
structure which groups the resources so as to implement most effectively the
strategic concept.”
Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008) was University Professor at Harvard and
former chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. He
authored and edited more than a dozen books, of which The Soldier and the State
(1957) defined the modern study of military sociology and Clash of Civilizations
(1999) was the most controversial. The article discussed here is anthologized in the
Cutler book listed earlier.
Owens, Mackubin Thomas. “Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking.” Naval War
College Review 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 111–24. Available at digital
-commons.usnwc.edu/.
Owens describes strategy as “a dialogue between policy and national power.”
“Real strategy must take account of such factors as technology, the availability of resources, and geopolitical realities. This last factor is critical, although
in a globalized world we sometimes forget that strategy is developed and
implemented in real time and space.” Owens fears that “[i]n the absence of a
coherent strategy, nonstrategic factors, such as bureaucratic and organizational
imperatives, will fill the void to the detriment of national security.”
After a light discussion of the history of strategy and its difference from policy
and a lengthier discussion of the “levels of strategy,” the article emphasizes
the responsibility of the crafters of a strategy to keep it updated in the face
of changing conditions. (Sometimes they need to prompt decision makers to
accept this.) “The strategy of a state is not self-correcting. If conditions change,
policy makers must be able to discern these changes and modify the strategy
and strategic goals accordingly.” The article combines discussion of this need
for changes with the immutabilities of geopolitics, one of the latter being the
“tyranny of distance.”
[T]he geographic position of the United States and its status as the dominant world
power requires that it be able to overcome the “tyranny of distance” in order to
project sufficient troops for necessary influence into a potentially hostile environment. To do so, U.S. forces must surmount such operational challenges as countering
an adversary’s asymmetrical antiaccess strategy; defending its space assets, bases,
ships, or even the continental United States from attack; and operating in urban
terrain. Part of thinking about operational challenges is making educated guesses about the types of military competition that may take place in the future.

To this is added a tyranny of limited resources, the availability of which often
wanes and waxes. The author uses U.S. strategy during the Cold War (in which
the Maritime Strategy played a considerable part, as concerned naval forces) as
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his most prominent example, not simply because of its apparent eventual
success, but because the U.S. Navy adapted to changes in fiscal resources
without losing its overall focus.
[W]hile the U.S. policy to contain the Soviet Union remained essentially constant
during the Cold War, certain factors changed. Accordingly, it is possible to identify
three distinct strategic periods during the Cold War, all of which had operational
and force-structure implications. Similarly, the post–World War II strategic concept of the United States Navy demonstrates a remarkable continuity from its origins in the late 1940s until 1989, emphasizing forward, offensive action to secure
sea control and to project power against the Soviets. The main variables during
the Cold War were available resources and technology. Thus, “during periods of
budgetary constraint or when the international climate was unfavorable to the
application of the preferred strategic concept,” the Navy’s leadership was forced
to modify the particulars of its strategy by curtailing its offensive orientation.

When resources became available, the Navy could shift greater resources
toward the operational offensive while maintaining defense in depth.
This corresponds to the long-held perception that “weaker” navies need to
optimize their systems for sea denial, shifting to a sea-control orientation only
if and when their resources can compare favorably with those of the previously
larger navies. Owens argues that the major point of strategy (once combined
with policy and operational concepts) should be directing resource and investment decisions—a process he admits is “idealized.” Other critics argue that
such focused direction rarely happens.
To the crafting of strategy the author adds the factor of strategic culture, bearing similarity to Huntington’s strategic concept. In defining strategic culture
he cites Carnes Lord as follows: “Strategic culture constitutes the traditional
practices and habits of thought by which military force is organized and employed by a society in the service of its political goals.” Strategic culture can be
a useful tool in maintaining support within the service for an overall strategic
vision, even while resources wax and wane. Traditional practices can be both a
support and a limit to the crafter, to be “spent” wisely.
The importance of this article is that it does present the crafter of strategy
with the “idealized” goals of his or her work, a viewpoint that can be modified as needed by other sources and experiences. (Bruce Stubbs’s depiction of
the crafting of strategy is hardly an “idealized view,” even if it has idealistic
motives.)
Owens was formerly a professor at the Naval War College and editor of the
lapsed journal Strategic Review, and now is editor of the journal Orbis.
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Reich, Simon, and Peter Dombrowski. The End of Grand Strategy: U.S. Maritime
Operations in the Twenty-First Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2017.
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski argue that military personnel are problem
solvers who focus with effect on immediate challenges and remain wary, or
at least skeptical, about the formulation of grand strategy. At the same time,
recent presidential administrations have failed to articulate clearly the limits
or end states of their “grand strategies,” the result being “that the link between
values and ‘ways, means, and ends’ defies the deductive formulations about
grand strategies debated by academics and formulated by policymakers.” The
result has been a failure to achieve strategic goals, despite the application of
increasing (albeit incremental) amounts of military power.
As their case study, the authors examine U.S. maritime activities and policies
since 1991, including maintaining primacy in the Persian Gulf, promoting a
follow-the-leader strategy on the high seas (the Cooperative Strategy /
thousand-ship-navy approach), building partner capacity, enforcing the
Proliferation Security Initiative, policing drug trafficking, and ensuring Arctic
navigation (with a mix of enthusiasm, reluctance, isolationism, and results).
The efforts and results do not add up to a unitary grand strategy, nor are they
directed in a truly coordinated, overarching manner. The authors themselves
“look back nostalgically at American grand strategy during the Cold War,
but its reputed coherence has been replaced by a new series of [academic]
challenges.”
Their conclusion is that one specific approach cannot be applied, but that
administrations need to choose policies from across a spectrum that stretches
from global primacy to restraint and isolationism, which effectively describes
“what America’s military actually does, day to day. They argue that a series
of fundamental recent changes in the global system, the inevitable jostling of
bureaucratic politics, and the practical limitations of field operations combine
to ensure that each presidential administration inevitably resorts to a variety
of strategies” (publisher’s description). In short, “the attempt to impose a single
overarching blueprint is no longer feasible.”
Of interest to crafters of strategy are the questions (1) whether a naval
strategic vision can and should follow slavishly documents that are intended
to present policies as a “grand strategy,” or instead focus on practicalities
that enhance national security, and (2) whether Navy strategy should reflect
a unitary narrative or provide an overall progression toward the solving of
current political-military issues.
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Reich is professor of global affairs at Rutgers University–Newark (NJ); Dombrowski is a long-serving professor, former department chair, and currently
Ruger Chair of National Security Economics at the Naval War College,
and contributed to the drafting of multiple USN strategies.
Rosenberg, David Alan. “Process: The Realities of Formulating Modern Naval Strategy.”
In Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir
Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, edited by James Goldrick
and John B. Hattendorf. Historical Monograph 10. Newport, RI: Naval War
College Press, 1993.
Published in an odd collection for its particular topic (as the author admits),
Rosenberg’s chapter examines the Navy’s institutional process of service
strategy development (rather than the actual crafting of particular strategies)
during the Cold War in general, and especially during the 1970s and ’80s Maritime Strategy period. Among the influential elements examined, the author
particularly emphasizes two factors: the priorities of the Navy’s leadership
and the influence of intelligence as a contributing factor. Rosenberg’s prime
leadership example is Adm. Arleigh A. Burke (Chief of Naval Operations
[CNO] 1955–61), who viewed as essential the development of a public strategy
allowing the Navy to “make its voice heard in national debates over strategy
and missions.” This corresponded with Huntington’s advice concerning the
need for a strategic concept to guide future Navy development. Burke also
pointed to the difference in opinions on whether strategy should emphasize
transformation or long-term continuity. Despite the fact that Burke spearheaded tremendously innovative acquisition programs—for instance, submarinelaunched (strategic nuclear) ballistic missiles—he viewed new weapons development as inclusions within ongoing incremental changes in strategy. In the
ends-ways-means approach to defining strategy, such innovations changed the
means but not necessarily the ways or ends.
Of comfort to crafters faced with an incremental process, Burke stated, “Naval
philosophy and maritime strategy are not spectacular. They offer no panaceas.
Their success depends upon long, dull hours of hard work in which no one
action is clearly decisive by itself. Its final success depends upon a series of
small successes.” Translating this into the crafting of strategy suggests that the
inclusion of common themes in the many documents in whose preparation
naval strategists participate to some degree—from the NSS to the Secretary
of the Navy’s Annual Report to Congress—constitutes the small successes on
which an overarching strategy can be built.
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In the body of his chapter, Rosenberg identifies “seventeen topics for investigation which point the way to the kinds of information we need to understand
the modern naval strategy-making process.” His list is directed at scholars
attempting to analyze naval strategy in retrospect; however, it also is useful to
the crafters of current and future strategy, not as a checklist for inclusion, but
as factors of which they need to be aware when assessing the practicality and
level of acceptance of their product. The seventeen topics are as follows:
1. The nature of training and education programs, career patterns, and
professional specialization
2. The career patterns and operational backgrounds of those in senior
leadership positions
3. Procurement costs, capabilities, operating patterns, and sustainment
requirements of naval weapon systems
4. Changes in tactical doctrine or naval operational art, or both
5. The administrative structure, operational doctrine, strategic plans, and
command-and-control organization of tactical units
6. The sources of intelligence information, including their nature, quality,
and frequency
7. The process of intelligence production, analysis, and dissemination
8. The structure, organization, and procedures of naval service-wide strategic
planning
9. The structure, organization, and procedures of naval service-wide program
and procurement planning
10. The state of research and development in naval technology
11. The state of the nation’s scientific and industrial infrastructure
12. The character and personalities of naval service national leadership
13. The organization and procedures of national strategic military planning
14. The organization and procedures of national program and procurement
planning
15. The character and personalities of national defense leadership
16. The character of the national political system as it relates to defense issues
17. The character and status of national financial and economic systems as
they relate to national defense
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These topics constitute the factors that both frame the effort and influence the
results, and they need to be considered from the start.
A scholar and reserve naval intelligence officer, Rosenberg has drafted numerous
classified histories of naval decision-making and programs for the Department
of the Navy.
Royal College of Defence Studies. Getting Strategy Right (Enough). Shrivenham, U.K.:
Ministry of Defence, 2017. Available at www.da.mod.uk/.
As the foreword states, “[t]his booklet is an updated version of an earlier text,
Thinking Strategically, first produced for use in the College in 2010 . . .
focus[ed] in particular on key themes . . . identified in the Chilcot Report, in
part in an attempt to respond to the direction from the Secretary of State for
Defence that we are to ‘embed the lessons of Chilcot in our DNA.’” (The Chilcot Report, released in 2016, found that British participation in the Iraq War
was unjustified and that military planning was “wholly inadequate. . . . Crucially, UK strategies tended to focus on describing the desired end state rather
than how it would be reached.”) “The inclusion of ‘enough’ in the title reflects
the fact while the perfect strategy is likely to remain elusive, our strategies
must be ‘good enough’ to compete successfully with those of our adversaries.”
“[W]ritten to summarise the art and science of strategy-making and implementation in a handy format,” the booklet begins by differentiating strategy
from policy and associating the establishment of ends-ways-means with policy.
Strategy is described as “finding plausible ways to deliver long-term policy
objectives over time, using the resources available (i.e., balancing ‘ends, ways
and means’). Like statecraft itself, strategy is inherently competitive.” After
discussing grand strategy, military strategy, operations, and tactics, the booklet
fixes on “a course of action that integrates ends, ways and means to meet
policy objectives” as its definition of strategy.
A “good strategy” is identified by the following characteristics:
1. It is designed to achieve a clearly stated policy goal.
2. It is characterized by clear ownership, at the right level, and is subject
to continuous constructive challenge, during both formulation and
implementation.
3. It has a central “big idea.”
4. It is easily communicated.
5. It acknowledges uncertainty and expects unforeseen outcomes.
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6. It is appropriately resourced.
7. It is based on reality and can adapt as circumstances change.
8. It accounts for all stakeholders.
9. It has continuity of leadership.
10. It recognizes that the opposition has a voice.
“Five simple tests” to evaluate any individual strategy (“[w]hatever approach
the strategist adopts”) are recommended:
[F]irst, it must be acceptable; second, it must be feasible; third, it must be suitable
to the circumstances; fourth, it must be sustainable, not only in terms of resources but also in terms of the common will of the members of an organisation or the
people of a nation to see it through; and fifth, it must be able to adapt as circumstances on the ground change. It is useful to consider each of these tests individually, noting that they should be applied using a critical thinking approach.

A discussion of the “instruments of power” particularly emphasizes “media
and strategic communications” as essential for public dissemination of strategy. “The importance of ‘wrapping’ a strategy in a compelling narrative—the
‘strategic narrative’—and ensuring that it is communicated at every possible
opportunity cannot be overestimated.”
To actually craft the strategy, the Royal College suggests an “iterative twelvestep approach—referred to as the ‘strategic assessment’”—and examines
“the Cold War policy of deterrence to demonstrate that seemingly disparate
approaches can combine to create an effective strategy.” The booklet takes an
apparent diversion to discuss the importance and nature of “strategic leadership” for both organizations and individuals—probably as a response to
Chilcot Report critiques. It then concludes with three appendices, of which
the last, “an approach to the conduct of a strategic assessment for a positional
strategy,” applies the twelve-step approach to an example through a series of
charts. This is the most practical how-to section of the booklet. The overall
accomplishment of the publication is to reflect the British way of developing
strategy under current political conditions.
Rumelt, Richard P. Good Strategy / Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters. 		
London: Profile Books, 2017.
Like most popular business books on strategy, Good Strategy / Bad Strategy
consists largely of cases and vignettes of recent real-world corporate
decision-making used to illustrate particular principles. However, unlike
most other authors of such books, Rumelt denounces much of written corporate strategy as equating “Mom-and-apple-pie values, fluffy packages of
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buzzwords, motivational slogans, and financial goals with ‘strategy.’” (This
quote is from a publisher’s description, not Rumelt.) Strategy requires the
making of a choice, and Rumelt’s estimate is that many leaders simply cannot
choose, because doing so would mean forgoing other options, provoking
disapproval from superiors or subordinates, or possibly being characterized as
a failure. The results are inertia and entropy. Yet strategy should be the central
task of the leader and serve as a specific and coherent approach to overcoming
obstacles to progress.
In using vignettes to describe good strategies, Rumelt includes U.S. defense
examples, particularly the approach of Andrew W. Marshall’s Office of Net
Assessment in crafting strategy to compete with the Soviet Union during the
latter stages of the Cold War. Other cases examined are Apple, General
Motors, Walmart, NVIDIA, Silicon Graphics, the Getty Trust, the Los Angeles
Unified School District, the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and the two Iraq wars
and Afghanistan intervention.
Rumelt uses the term kernel to describe an approach to assessing a challenge,
developing a guiding approach to overcoming it, and designing specific
actions. The key is to focus on “proximate” objectives—those that can be
accomplished in the period foreseen, even if it’s a stretch, rather than shooting
for idealized end states that are distant because they remain vague or general.
Considerable attention is paid to the “sources of power,” or sources of strategic
advantage, particularly in business competition, but these go beyond those
listed in other (military) sources (economic, strategic communications, etc.) to
include intangibles that define the degree to which a strategy is detailed.
With roughly equal opportunity and resources, the company that has focused
its strategy on overcoming obstacles will possess a strategic advantage. A
focused approach to strategy includes asking “questions and then questions of
those questions” (what others might call challenging assumptions).
As Emeritus Professor of Business and Society at the University of California–
Los Angeles and formerly as a professor at Harvard Business School, Rumelt
favors a Socratic-type dialogue for overcoming groupthink and other psychological barriers. Eschewing academic language, the book is a fast read, was a best
seller in its first year of publication, and remains influential.
Strachan, Hew. “The Lost Meaning of Strategy.” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005), pp. 33–54.
Strachan effectively argues that the term strategy has lost its meaning, since it
routinely is used as a synonym for policy. From the period of Clausewitz
and his contemporaries to approximately the end of the First World War,
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strategy referred to “the conduct of war as exercised at the level of military
commander.” Given the enormity of the two world wars and a focus by Britain
and the United States on a large maritime component to defense, the term
grand strategy came into vogue to describe “the coordination of allies in
different theatres of war and to mobilise all national resources for the prosecution of war.” Although this elevated the concept of defense strategy to mean
the planning conducted by the seniormost political decision makers, not that
simply at the level of the military commander, it also allowed the term strategy
to be applied to all sorts of nonmilitary endeavors. Strachan concludes that
“[s]ince the end of the Cold War the vocabulary of war-making has lost
definition, making lesser conflicts seem larger than they are, ‘militarising’
foreign policy and robbing the nation state of an important conceptual tool
for adapting military means to political objectives.”
Sir Hew Strachan’s influence stems from the fact that he was Chichele Professor
of the History of War at Oxford—considered the top professorial position for a
military historian in the United Kingdom—as well as his teaching stints at the
University of Glasgow, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and University of
Saint Andrews.
Swartz, Peter. U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What
to Consider before You Write One. CQR D0020071.A1. Arlington, VA: CNA
Strategic Studies, 2009. Available at www.cna.org/.
Similar in format to this Black Book, this CNA document is a briefing-slideand-text compendium by Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), one of the
drafters of the U.S. Navy’s famed Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. The paper
combines his personal experiences with the findings of a larger report/briefing
he coauthored entitled U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction, Background and Analyses (CNA MISC D0026421.A1/Final [December
2011], available at www.cna.org/).
Swartz provides recommendations for crafting the Navy’s “declaratory” strategy: “What it says to itself and the world about what it should do and does, and
where it is heading.” (This corresponds with Huntington’s strategic concept.)
Swartz notes that “[t]he Navy—and any of the Nation’s large military institutions—has many other types of strategies (and policies, visions, etc.). Ideally,
they all are aligned with—and indeed derive from—its declaratory strategy.”
Swartz chooses the term capstone documents to refer to “those documents—
typically signed by the Chief of Naval Operations—that seek to explain and
guide the Navy. They have come in many guises—strategies, visions, concepts,
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doctrines, policies, etc.—and under many names.” Observing that his larger
study “discusses in some detail the differences and similarities of all these
types of capstone documents, as well as the context and development processes,” Swartz notes that there is a need for “‘cuts to the chase’—focusing on
recommendations of immediate use to Navy staff officers”—hence his “what to
consider before you write one” version.
Following an analysis of the historical elements that required changes to
U.S. strategic documents between 1970 and 2009, Swartz identifies rationales
for maintaining a capstone strategy: (1) explain the need for the Navy, (2)
explain how the Navy meets that need, (3) explain where the Navy is heading,
(4) implement specific ideas of naval leadership (and drafters), and (5) “[u]nify
Navy elements in a common conceptual framework” and “[b]reak down internal Navy community and platform parochialism,” among others. Swartz identifies impediments to crafting strategy and emphasizes the need for multiple
versions of a capstone strategic document (unclassified, classified, etc.), each
tailored to a particular intended audience. He also includes an extensive
checklist of what should be questioned and considered during the crafting
process, and concludes with best practices.
Swartz’s work is the most detailed briefing on the intent of recent Navy/naval
capstone documents, with recommendations that accord closely with those
of this Black Book.
During his years on active duty, Capt. Peter Swartz, USN (Ret.), was a key
drafter of the 1980s Maritime Strategy. He later spent many years as a
scholar-analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses.
Tangredi, Sam J. “Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in
2019.” Naval War College Review 72, no. 2 (Spring 2019), pp. 129–65. Available
at digital-commons.usnwc.edu/.
The article details a situation in which, absent a public capstone “strategic vision” crafted at the direction of the seniormost naval leaders, a multiplicity of
documents vie to define the Navy and its future, confusing both internal and
public perceptions of its objectives. The author points to seven primary documentary sources—none of which were (at the time of the article’s publication)
clearly endorsed or repudiated as the strategy—that might provide guidance
to the Navy’s strategic planning. As a result, those crafting or determining
specific Navy policies and doctrine can cherry-pick concepts from the various
documents that might suit the preferences of their own individual naval organizations. Simultaneously, it becomes difficult for the Navy to gain public and
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congressional support for its future-force-structure plans, since they appear
unconnected to a single defining strategy.
This provides an obvious argument for an overarching, public, strategic vision
that could provide the guidance to generate an internal unity of purpose, elicit
support from the American people, and clarify potential areas of cooperation
with allies and partners. Given the myriad “strategies” that individual naval
organizations have published to praise their own efforts and rationalize their
desires for increased resources, such an overarching strategic vision (signed
by the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, or both) is needed—to use a literary
metaphor from J. R. R. Tolkien’s books—as “One Ring to rule them all.”
U.S. Defense Dept. Strategy. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-18. Washington, DC: Joint 		
Chiefs of Staff, 2018. Available at www.jcs.mil/.
Signed by the director of Joint Force Development (J7) and describing itself
as providing “guidance to develop [strategy], implement strategy, and assess
strategy” and examining “how strategy is made, who makes it, what moral
criteria guide strategic decisions, and what pitfalls may occur in the making of
strategy,” this joint doctrine note (JDN) also states that it is “not authoritative.”
“If conflicts arise between the contents of this JDN and the contents of a joint
publication (JP), the JP will take precedence for the activities of joint forces
unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues guidance that is more
current. This JDN may supplement strategy discussions in JP 1, Doctrine for
the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; and JP 5-0, Joint
Planning.” These introductory statements immediately raise questions about
the exact audience and purpose of the note.
Neither a how-to manual nor a comparative study of alternative methods,
the document gives primacy to the ends-ways-means definition of strategy. It
maintains that all strategies follow that fundamental logic, to which it adds
“risk” and “costs” as elements of assessment.
The executive summary consists of a list of terms that separates grand strategy
from military strategy, and includes discussion of such terms as instruments of
national power (summarized in the DIME acronym), the nature and character of warfare, and strategic competition. The nature of warfare is viewed as
being constant, the character as variable. Strategic competition is described as
falling along a spectrum that includes cooperation, competition below armed
conflict, and armed conflict.
The note discusses the sequential relationship among the NSS, National Military Strategy (NMS), and combatant command strategies (the latter described
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as bridging national strategies and joint operational planning). A direct (and
lengthy, in terms of the overall note) discussion of the legal requirement for
an NMS is included. Interestingly, it does not mention a Secretary of Defense
National Defense Strategy (NDS), despite the fact that the first NDS had been
issued prior to the publication of this JDN. Sidebars quoting from Joint Force
Quarterly articles and National War College course papers are included, some
of which introduce acronyms not in use elsewhere (such as MIDFIELD, for
military, informational, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, economic, law, and
development). There is no discussion of the individual services being involved
in the drafting of strategy, conforming to the view that they should not be.
The note advises that “[n]o strategy is infallible” and posits that, “[g]iven the
complexity of designing strategy, it is understandable that some strategists
seek ways to simplify the process. There are, however, several traps to recognize and avoid.” The identified traps include “searching for strategic panaceas,” “emphasizing process over product,” “seeking the decisive fait accompli,”
“using labels such as limited warfare,” and “mismatching political-military
outcomes.” The note concludes with advisory statements such as “strategists
must rely on logic if they hope to produce an effective strategy.”
Overall, the JDN does not compare favorably with less-official discussions of
strategy (to the extent that they exist), and its hasty preparation is evident in
sections that, for example, refer to “the following three questions” but include
four questions. Its importance, however, is that it appears to reflect some of the
Joint Staff approach to strategy development.
Yarger, Harry R. Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy.
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006.
Yarger begins with a succinct definition of strategy: “In simplistic terms,
strategy at all levels is the calculation of objectives, concepts, and resources
within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable outcomes than
might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of others.” As do several other
sources, he insists on a distinction between plans and strategies. “Strategy is
not planning. . . . [I]t partakes of a different mindset. Planning makes strategy
actionable. It relies on a high degree of certainty—a world that is concrete and
can be addressed in explicit terms. . . . Planning is essentially linear and deterministic. . . . The planning process is essential to reduce uncertainty at the
tactical level. . . . The planning process works because the lower the level,
the more limited the scope and complexity, and the shorter the timeline;
hence, the number of unknowns is limited and can be compensated for in
branches and sequels to create ‘certainty.’” With that in mind, “[g]ood strategy
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development requires the military professional to step out of the planning
mindset and adopt one more suited for strategic thinking. In the strategic
mindset, the professional military strategist embraces the complexity and
chaos of the strategic environment and envisions all its continuities and possibilities in seeking to create favorable strategic effects in support of national
interests.”
Yarger “expound[s] and advocate[s]” the U.S. Army War College’s ends-waysmeans model. However, he also expresses them as “objectives (ends)”; “strategic concepts (ways)” (which differs greatly from the way Huntington originally
defined strategic concept); and “resources (means).”
The inputs to the strategy process are described: “From an accurate analysis of
the strategic environment, the strategist determines the threats to and opportunities for the advancement or protection of these interests. From policy, the
strategist receives the political leadership’s vision, guidance, and priorities of
effort in regard to interests. Thus, in constructing a valid strategy, the strategist is bounded by the nature of the strategic environment, the dictates of policy, and the logic of strategy.” Yarger emphasizes uncertainty as the key element
of the strategic environment, which he captures under the U.S. Army War
College acronym VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity).
The division of roles is clear between strategists and policy makers: “The
strategist is responsible for mastering the external and internal facets of the
strategic environment, adhering to policy or seeking change, and applying
the logic of strategy to strategy formulation. He articulates the strategy in the
rational model of ends, ways, and means; but leadership remains responsible
for the decision to execute the strategy.” Nevertheless, “the strategist must sort
through an arena of cognitive dissonance to arrive at the ‘real’ truth. The real
truth best serves interests and policy in the long run; the strategist must reject
the expedient, near-term solution for the long-term benefit.” Yarger has no
suggestion regarding what the strategist should do if decision makers reject the
“real truth.” (This is where and when the crafters of strategy must use all their
marketing skills and persuasiveness.)
Yarger summarizes his perspective in the following fifteen “assumptions and
premises of strategy”:
1. “Strategy is proactive and anticipatory but not predictive.”
2. “Strategy is subordinate to policy. Political purpose dominates all levels of
strategy.”
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3. “Strategy must be consistent with the nature of the strategic environment.”
4. “Strategy maintains a holistic perspective. . . . Strategy reflects a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within the strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, and third-order effects of its own
choices on the efforts of those above, below, and on the strategist’s own
level.”
5. “Strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and other actors.
Any strategy, once known or implemented, threatens the status quo and
creates risk for the equilibrium of the strategic environment.”
6. “Strategy is founded in what is to be accomplished and why it is to be accomplished. Strategy focuses on a preferred end state.”
7. “Strategy is an inherently human enterprise. . . . The role of belief systems
and cultural perceptions of all the players is important in the development
and execution of strategy.”
8. “Friction is an inherent part of strategy.”
9. “Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes.”
10. “Strategy is hierarchical. Just as strategy is subordinate to policy, lower
levels of strategy and planning are subordinate to higher levels of strategy.
The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates span of control.”
11. “Strategy exists in a symbiotic relationship with time. Strategy must be integrated into the stream of history. . . . Small changes at the right time can
have large and unexpected consequences. Consequently, an intervention at
an early date has greater effect at less cost than a later intervention.”
12. “Strategy is cumulative. Effects in the strategic environment are
cumulative.”
13. “Efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy.”
14. “Strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the objectives
sought, the methods used to pursue the objectives, and the resources
available. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, and means are part of
an integral whole and work synergistically to achieve strategic effect at that
level of strategy.”
15. “Risk is inherent to all strategy. Strategy is subordinate to the uncertain
nature of the strategic environment. Success is contingent on implementation of an effective strategy—ends, ways, and means that positively interact
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with the strategic environment. Failure is the inability to achieve one’s
objectives.”
A retired U.S. Army colonel, at the time of writing Yarger was a professor at the
U.S. Army War College.
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